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Fictional Reality or Real Fictionality? The Relationship between Fictional Texts and
Psychological Perceptions of Societies in Conflict
Yuval Benziman

Abstract
The study of groups’ behaviors in conflicts has shown that societies favor the in-group,
delegitimize the out-group, and provide explanations for members of society as to why the
conflict erupted and how to cope with it. It has been claimed that societies share a
psychological in-group repertoire, an ethos of conflict, and that they develop a culture of
conflict. As part of societies’ mechanisms, culture and fictional products – films, books and
plays – have an important role in shaping the way people perceive, think and act in conflicts.
Yet fictional texts, by their mere characteristics, provide a discourse which is more
ambiguous and more equivocal: They speak in different voices, have many layers, and
present the fictional reality in complex and even self-contradicting ways. There is therefore a
contradiction between the role cultural texts supposedly have in an ethos of conflict, and the
complex discourse they present. Looking at novels and films produced in Israel in the 1980s
as a case study, the article shows that cultural products do not necessarily go in line with what
one could expect from texts produced in a society in conflict. It is shown that in this
particular case the cultural products provide a picture that resembles the ethos of conflict that
will take the forefront 20 years later but not of the time in which they were produced. Three
hypotheses are suggested in order to explain this gap.

Introduction
In his influential book, Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson claims that unlike
earlier times when communities were small enough for members of society to meet and know
each other, modern communities try to find ways that will help them imagine their shared
identities (Anderson, 1991) and cultural texts have an enormous role in doing that.
Continuing that school of thought, Bhabha (1990) argues that nations are in a constant
process of creating themselves through narratives: there is a continuing dialectical
interchange between the nation which creates a master-narrative for its cultural texts on the
one hand, and the cultural texts that provide a narrative for the nation on the other hand. As
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Bruner (1991) notes, when discussing the different features of narratives, “There seems to be
some sense in which narrative, rather than referring to ‘reality’, may in fact create or
constitute it, as when ‘fiction’ creates a ‘world’ of its own” (Bruner, 1991, p. 13).
For these and other reasons, as Jameson (1981) claims, it is a mistake to try to
differentiate between cultural texts which have social political aspects and those who
supposedly do not. Everything that is poetic is also political, and “…there is nothing that is
not social and historical – indeed, that everything is ‘in the last analysis’ political” (Jameson,
1981, p. 20). Therefore, every cultural text should be looked at as a political text; and
analyses of such texts should reveal the underlying assumptions, the unconscious political
worlds, and the hidden ideologies that they are based on. As Dowling (1984) explains it,
taking the Freudian interpretation of dreams as a reference, when a dream is dreamt the
unconscious supposedly does not exist because the dreamer experiences it as a full
independent story. Yet the unconscious actually dictates the dream. Likewise, cultural texts
are supposedly autonomous, but they are actually constructed and based on ideologies,
schools of thoughts, social perceptions and collective shared values. That is why genres
change as times change (Bruner, 1991) and different nations at different times produce
different kinds of narratives in their cultural texts.
Fictional texts produced in societies in conflict have an important role in shaping the
conflict and introducing it to the societies involved. It is even claimed that societies in
intractable conflict actually share a culture of conflict in which “the socio-psychological
infrastructure… is not only widely shared but also appears to be dominant in public
discourse… (and) is expressed in cultural products such as literary books, TV programs,
films, theatre…” (Bar-Tal, 2010, p. 191). Cultural products help the members of society cope
with the stressful experience: they illuminate the conflict situation, justify problematic and
violent acts toward the enemy, create a sense of differentiation and superiority, prepare
society for difficult conditions, motivate solidarity and contribute to strengthening the social
identity.
Although fictional cultural texts are part of the building of the national narrative and
of the culture of conflict, they suggest a different discourse by their mere definition: they are
more ambiguous and more equivocal than the way societies supposedly think and act during
conflicts. Fictional texts are not obligated to tell a mimetic story about reality; they do not
have to be true or false and do not necessarily have any conclusion. On the contrary, what
makes them interesting and unique is the fact that they have many layers, talk in different
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voices (see for example: Bakhtin, 1981) and provide different perspectives than one can see
in the non-fictional discourse. Therefore, there is a gap, a kind of contradiction, between the
fictional texts’ complex characteristics and the claim that they actually not only take part –
but also have a significant role – in shaping societies’ experiences and actions in conflicts.
Although there seems to be an understanding that cultural texts do not have a “bottom
line”, that they are not manifests or political pamphlets, the discipline of conflict research
commonly looks at them as such. For example, relying on scholarly research – from both
social science studies and humanistic studies – Bar-Tal concludes that society’s narratives
emerge through these cultural texts that “provide a ‘good story’ that is well understood and
meaningful. The plot of the story is simple and clear, elaborated in black-and-white form with
unambiguous villains, victims, and heroes” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 257) and that “through these
cultural products, societal beliefs and emotions of the socio-psychological infrastructure are
disseminated and can reach every sector of the public” (Bar-Tal, 2013, p. 260).
The picture is more complex because of the special traits of fictional texts which are
not the same as other kinds of discourses. In what follows, by studying how the Israeli-Arab
conflict is manifested in Israeli cultural texts of the 1980s, the complex relation between the
conflict and how it is seen in fictional texts will be viewed. The decision to focus on Israeli
cultural texts of the late 1970s and the 1980s was done for three main reasons:
1. The end of the 1970s and through the 1980s was a time of change both in how Israeli
society perceived the long-lasting Israeli-Arab conflict, and in the way Israeli cultural
texts dealing with the conflict represented it (Benziman, 2013; Oren, 2009). Therefore
it provides an opportunity to view the changes that occurred in the two different
discourses – the social-political and the cultural-fictional – which can be compared.
2. Israeli culture – and more specifically Israeli literature and films – has always had an
important and influential part in shaping Israel’s collective ethos and national identity
(Hever, 2002; Miron, 1993; Schwartz, 2005; Shohat, 2010). Therefore, studying the
dynamic relation between reality and fictionality in this case is of special interest.
3. One of the basic traits of a protracted conflict is that it influences a large portion of
society’s daily lives and wide aspects of its behaviors (Azar, Jureidini, & McLaurin,
1978). The Israeli-Arab conflict is one of such conflicts, as the core disputes between
the sides are real and have to do with lands, infrastructures, money and more; yet this
conflict has lasted for so long and became so complicated and connected to other
conflicts, that it influences almost all parts of the societies’ conducts to a point where
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it is sometimes hard to tell what is the real conflict and what are its consequences
(Kriesberg, 1980). Its influence is rooted so deeply in the daily lives of the societies
involved, that the tendency of Israeli-Jewish society (the in-group) to favor itself over
the Arabs (the out-group) is seen in almost any comparison between the two groups
(Maoz, 1996) and reaches a point where the in-group holds extreme positions like
support for violation of human rights of the out-group (Maoz & McCauley, 2011). It
is therefore argued that in order to end the conflict, a just and fair distribution of real
infrastructures might not be enough, and that psychological and cultural dimensions
should be overcome in order to solve it (Kelman, 1999). Therefore, the immense and
widespread influence of this conflict on all sections of the Israeli society and culture
makes the study of the role of cultural texts in the ethos of conflict all the more
important.
Methodology
The methodology described in this article is an innovative combination of scholarly
studies from two different disciplines: social political psychology and cultural studies.
Looking at these two different academic fields, which are not too often studied together,
provides a new and richer picture about cultures in conflict, narrative discourse produced by
fiction texts, societies’ perceptions of conflicts and the relations between them.
The research done on fictional texts derives its roots from interpretations of culture.
Its origins can be summarized in Clifford Geertz (1973) well known sayings about the study
of culture: “…the analysis of it… be therefore not an experimental science in search of law
but an interpretative one in search of meaning” (Geertz, 1973, p. 5) in which the scholar
“characteristically approaches such broader interpretations and more abstract analyses from
the direction of exceedingly extended acquaintances with extremely small matters” (Geertz,
1973, p. 21). On the other hand, the data about the public perception of the conflict is mostly
quantitative, based on interpretation and analyses of social science surveys and polls. By
combining these two different approaches, it is possible to compare the discourse of the
fictional texts about the conflict and society’s perceptions and ethos of conflict.
The Context: Israelis’ Perception of The Israeli-Arab Conflict in the Late 1970s and the
1980s
Major developments occurred in the Israeli-Arab conflict during the late 1970s
through the 1980s. These changes – in the relationships between Israel and its neighbor Arab
countries, Israel and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, and between Israel and its
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Arab-Palestinian citizens – influenced Israeli public perception of the Israeli-Arab conflict as
a whole:
1. Israel and its neighbor Arab countries – In 1979 Israel and Egypt signed a peace treaty
and by 1981 Israel withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula. This peace agreement
demonstrated for the Israeli public that the Israeli-Arab conflict was no longer a threat
to Israel’s existence; the notion that Israel could be secure due to the fact that it has
peace agreements and that the land-for-peace approach could be implemented,
changed the way Israeli society perceived the conflict (Horowitz & Lissak, 1990). In
1982 the Lebanon War took place and also fundamentally changed the way the Israeli
public viewed relations between Israel and its neighbors; Israelis implicitly
acknowledged that Israel was not only a peace-seeking country that fights no choice
and just wars (Ben-Porat, 2008), but that it also initiates wars.
These two developments, taken together, weakened fundamental elements of the
Israeli traditional narrative, including the belief that Israel is always right, is always reaching
for peace, doesn’t have a partner to sign a treaty with on the Arab side, and the popular
conviction that more land equals more security. Israel appeared to its own citizens to be a
country that is not always right, that has a partner for peace in the Arab world, and for which
a peace agreement is essential to help stabilize the region and to ensure Israel’s security more
efficaciously than victories of wars did.
2. Relations between Jewish and Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel – On March 30th,
1976, a brutal clash took place between the Israeli police and Arab-Palestinian-Israeli
citizens demonstrating against government expropriation of lands. Six Israeli ArabPalestinians were killed in these clashes and the Arab-Palestinian minority
vehemently claimed that Israeli police used disproportional force solely because the
protestors were Arabs. This day, which later became known as Land Day, brought
into the open the dimensions of Israeli Arabs’ distrust of the Jewish Israeli state, and
is considered a landmark in the conflict between Arab and Jewish Israeli citizens
(Smooha, 1993).
Israeli scholars provide different explanations about the causes for the
outbreak of the conflict between Jewish and Arab-Palestinian citizens in the late
1970s and through the 1980s. Some believe it emerged because of the
Palestinianization of the Arab minority and the rise of Jewish nationalism after the
1967 War. Others maintain that the political change in Israel after the elections of
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1977, ending the dominant Labor Party-led regime and bringing the Likud Party to
power for the first time, was the important factor (see Eisenstadt, 1989; Kimmerling
1998; Smooha, 1993). Regardless of causation, the Jewish–Arab conflict inside Israel
underwent an important transformation. Even though the conflict had been there for
almost a century, particularly since the establishment of Israel as a Jewish state and
the 1948 War, its intensity increased at the time. It is therefore not surprising that a
new generation of Arab-Palestinian Israeli citizens, born in the 1970s, would become
unprecedentedly demanding in its struggle against the Israeli establishment. This new
generation, labeled by Israeli sociologists as the Stand-Tall Generation, grew up
during the 1980s and 1990s with no illusions of being able to achieve the civil
equality that their parents had thought they could acquire (Rabinowitz & Abu Baker,
2005).
3. Relations between Israelis and Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank – During the
1980s crucial changes occurred in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza. These included an increase in violence, Israel Defense
Forces’ harsher policy against the Palestinians, a crisis of the Palestinian economy,
and the establishment of a local Palestinian leadership as opposed to the traditional
exile leadership (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1999; 2003). These components were some
of the factors that led to the outbreak of the Intifada in late 1987. The Intifada itself
was a very important milestone in the relations between the rival sides and influenced
the beginning of the peace process which started in the 1990s. Yet, even more
important than the Intifada itself was the growing realization by Israelis that the
Palestinians could no longer be seen as isolated groups fighting for local rights.
Rather, they must be perceived as a people or a nation struggling for an independent
and autonomous state (Kimmerling & Migdal, 1999; 2003).
Israelis’ Ethos of Conflict and Psychological Inter-group Repertoire
These changes in the conflict led to a dramatic change in the Israeli ethos of conflict,
psychological inter-group repertoire and in the perception of the image of the Arab (Bar-Tal
& Teichman, 2005). Oren (2009) shows that it is during the late 1970s and through the 1980s,
and until the beginning of the 1990s that Israel’s ethos of conflict changed. For example, in
the late 1970s delegitimization of Arabs in Israeli textbooks had significantly dropped (Firer,
1985) and less pejorative terminology was used in describing the Arab violent resistance to
Jewish immigration and settlement (Podeh, 2002). Public polls of the time show that
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perception of Arabs as intending to destroy Israel dramatically lost strength after Sadat’s visit
to Israel in 1979 (Stone, 1983). Public polls of that time also show an influential drop in
Israeli Jews’ belief that Israel can successfully wage war against all the Arab states (Oren,
2009). Textbooks transformed from a didactic patriotic approach to a more academic one
(Dror, 2004) and Israelis’ willingness to sacrifice themselves for their state dropped (Oren,
2009). It is also at this time that peace beliefs became more central in Israeli society and
more concrete than an abstract idea as it was before.
Oren separates the changes of the Israeli ethos of conflict into five different periods.
She claims that when comparing the ethos of conflict of the years 1977-1987 to the ethos
during earlier years, there is a “general weakening of the ethos of conflict as a unifying
element for Israeli society and its various divisions” (Oren, 2009, p. 15). This weakening is
mainly related to contradictions between the old elements of the ethos and the new reality in
which Israel did sign a peace agreement with Egypt. Israeli society realized that there was not
one unified Arab population in conflict with it, but rather there are a few different conflicts
between Israel and its Arabs neighbors. The third period, defined by Oren as the period
between 1987 and 1993, although starting in the Intifada, also showed “a further decline in
the strength of the ethos of conflict in Israeli society” (Oren, 2009, p. 16). This decline had to
do with contradictions between valuing greater Israel and keeping Israel as a Jewish
democratic state, and a decrease in the perception of continuing the status quo as good for
Israel (Goldberg, Barzilai, & Inbar, 1991; Shamir & Shamir, 2000). It is at this period that
Israelis showed more optimism about finding a way to end the conflict, and less fear of the
Arabs wish to exterminate Israel (Oren, 2009).
These changes all lead to the period between 1993 and 2000 when the ethos of
conflict was the weakest with “a reduced tendency to consider the conflict as a zero-sum
game” (Oren, 2009, p. 19). Yet in the year 2000, after the failure of the Camp David talks and
the outbreak of the Second Intifada, the ethos of conflict strengthened due to the new
perception of Israeli society in which Israelis perceived themselves as wanting peace but not
believing it can be reached because of their adversaries (Oren, 2009). This can be seen, for
example, in the platforms of both the leading right wing and left wing parties running in the
Israeli election at the time (Oren, 2010).
Although Oren (2009) separates her analyses to different time periods, in the timeframe discussed in this paper, it is important to note that the general picture is one in which a
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decrease in the ethos of conflict started from the late 1970s and through the 1980s. This trend
continued in the 1990s but completely changed in 2000 after the second Intifada.
The Conflict’s Representation in Israeli Cultural Texts of the Late 1970s and the 1980s
Societies in conflict form a culture of conflict that is rooted in the themes and symbols
of society; in its mass media, theatre, literature and films. These have an important role in
influencing society, making it understand the conflict and coping with it (Bar-Tal, 2010). It
could be assumed that the changes discussed above in the “real” conflict, in public opinions,
in the inter-group psychological repertoire and in the ethos of the conflict – will be in line
with the changes in the cultural texts. And so, while the shape, focus, and perception of the
Israeli-Arab conflicts and ethos of conflict started to change in the late 1970s, the
representation of the conflict in cultural texts of the time also changed. But although the
changes happened simultaneously, they weren’t identical and at times even showed
contradicting perceptions of the conflict.
Some aspects of the changes in the ethos of conflict were similar to the changes that
occurred in the cultural texts; it is at this decade that Israeli films became more critical of the
national narrative and changed the way they portrayed the Israeli-Arab conflict. After
decades in which they almost fully embraced the Israeli-Jewish national narrative (Shohat,
1989) the perception of the conflict became more complex and less focused on the IsraeliJewish perspective (Shohat, 2010). Scholars debate whether the films of the 1980s truly
brought a new narrative to Israeli cinema or only proposed a new way to tell the same IsraeliJewish narrative (see Gertz, 2004; Loshitzky, 2001; Ne’eman, 1995; Shohat, 1991), but all
agree that a significant change did occur in the representation of the conflict. Interestingly, at
this same time some important changes also took place in the Palestinian cinema (Gertz &
Khleifi, 2008).
It is in this decade that Israeli theatre plays were more focused on the conflict; as
Orian (1996) shows, between 1982 and 1994 Arab characters can be seen in more than a
hundred Israeli plays, in central roles, a number that exceeds the number of all plays dealing
with this topic in the previous seven decades combined. It is not only that the quantity of
Arab characters increased, but their representation was also transformed: from stereotypical
characters, presented as the other, whom the Jews fear but to whom they are also attracted,
they became non-stereotypical, rounded characters who more authentically present the Arab
narrative (Orian, 1996).
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It is in this decade that Israeli literature also changed as more novels were written on
the Israeli-Arab conflict than before (Benziman, 2010). The primary genre in which the
conflict was represented changed as well, from short stories to novels (Morahg, 1987). As
Bruner (1991) notes, a change in genres “may have quite as powerful an influence in shaping
our modes of thought as they have in creating the realities that their plots depict” (Bruner,
1991, p. 15). And so this change at this time should be related to a general perception that
more must be written in order to understand the conflict; and it allows, at least theoretically, a
more polyphonic (see Bakhtin, 1981) representation of the conflict, in which a variety of
voices from the Israeli-Jewish narrative can be heard and in which even the Arab voice could
be audible.
The Arab characters in these texts became more rounded and complex (Levy, 1983;
Morahg, 1986). They were no longer stereotypes (Ramras-Rauch, 1989), who only project
onto the Jewish hero (Ben-Ezer, 1999). Instead, they stood for themselves, and exposed the
reader to the Arab perspective of the conflict, and not only the Jewish-Israeli one (Perry,
1986). This new representation of Arabs and their more visible presence also resulted in
ending the dichotomy and hierarchy between Jews and Arabs, and posited a more equal
discourse (Gertz, 1993).
Yet other aspects of the representation of the conflict in cultural texts show that they
did not change as did the ethos of conflict, but actually went in a different direction. The
focal point remained an Israeli-Jewish one; even when the Arab characters became more
complex, they still told the story of how the Israeli-Jewish narrative looks at them. As
Oppenheimer (2008) points out, these texts, like most of Israeli texts that represent Arab
characters, were written with an Orientalistic approach, framing the topic from a supercilious
perspective of how the Jewish-westernized society sees the inferior Arab-eastern one.
What actually happened is that even though important changes occurred in the
conflict and in the cultural texts of the time, the texts did not endorse the changes that
occurred in the ethos of conflict. Looking at the tendencies shown in these studies and based
on Benziman’s (2011) study of the representation of the conflict as a whole and not solely on
the representation of the Arab characters, at least four themes of the representation of the
conflict in the 1980s can be seen which contradict the changes in the Israeli ethos of conflict
of the time. The tendencies listed below exist in most of the major texts of the decade which
deal with the conflict, but in what follows only a few examples will be given to illustrate
them:
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1. Although the conflict is their main topic, the texts dealing with the conflict are mostly
concerned with the feeling that it is impossible to grasp and understand it. In a way,
these texts are oxymoronous as they tell a story about the inability to tell the story of
the conflict (Benziman, 2011). For example, David Grossman’s (1983) The Smile of
the Lamb (Heyuch Hagdi) is a novel in which the question of what is true and what is
false is the light-motif and in which the characters “understand that they cannot
understand” (Gertz, 1993, p. 96). This novel is rendered by four different narrators (an
Arab, two Israeli officers, and a psychologist who is married to one of the officers and
has an affair with the other officer) as if to say that in order to describe the conflict
one needs several distinct points of view because one perspective is simply
insufficient. In addition, the characters involved in the conflict cannot construct a
coherent narrative that will give them a clear perspective on it. The identity of each of
the characters seems split and embroiled in itself. They cannot manage to find a full
and coherent prism through which to view the world. As a result of the absence of a
stable identity, the characters seek group-belongings that will help them understand
and define themselves, but their attempt fails. The image conveyed is one in which
everyone sees the conflict differently and no communication between the different
prisms materializes. However – as opposed to a regular Rashomon in which each
narrative is full and coherent in its own way and competes with the others – the chaos
and fragmentation in this text results in the collapse of the prism of all the individuals
who cannot tell a full and coherent story about the conflict.
As mentioned, this is an example, one of many, of texts of this time which present the
same tendency. The Lover (Ham’ahev) by Yehoshua (1977), Delusion (Ta’atu’on) by
Yitzhak Ben-Ner (1989), Martyr (Shahid) by Avi Valentin (1989) and others are all told in
the same divided, multi-narrators technique, which splits reality in order to try to understand
it. Arabesques by Anton Shammas (1986), a novel written in Hebrew by an Arab, is also
structurally divided into portions titled “The Teller” and “The Tale.” The Road to Ein Harod
(Haderech l’ein Harod) by Kenan (1984) tells a story that is set partly above ground and
partly underground, in which “whatever happens above ground level has no meaning for what
happens underground” (Kenan, 1984, p. 71).
In other texts of the decade, the inability to present the conflict comprehensively
through one stable prism is dealt with by presenting the interaction between Israelis and
Palestinian-Arabs as a dialog between deaf people. In the movie Fictitious Marriage (Nisuim
Volume 21, Number 1

13

Peace and Conflict Studies
Fictiviim), for example, the only way the Jewish-Israeli protagonist can create a dialogue
with his Palestinian co-workers is by pretending to be mute, and so only by not talking can he
attempt to speak a common language with them. Likewise, in the novel A Trumpet in the
Wadi (Hatsutsra bavadi) by Michael (1987), the only dialog of equals is between Alex, a
Jewish-Russian immigrant who does not speak Hebrew, and Huda, the Arab who teaches him
the language of the nation that oppresses her. And some of the Israeli movies of the period
are bilingual, spoken in Hebrew and Arabic (e.g., Cup Final, [Gmar Gavia], and Avanti
Popolo), but not translated into both languages (only to English subtitles).
Other texts manifest a total confusion between fiction and reality. The characters deal
obsessively with questions of truth and falsity, signifying that in the conflict one cannot
determine what has really happened and what is imagined. The obsessive preoccupation with
these questions paints a picture in which the characters find it difficult to believe in the reality
in which they are involved and to organize it in some rational narrative. Then there comes a
moment, as in The Smile of the Lamb, when “the question if something is real or not is no
longer important” and “that there is a lie that two believe in, and then it is no longer a lie, but
a new kind of a more tolerant truth” (Grossman, 1983, p. 156, 125). The same is seen in
Ta’atu’on when “everything is so confusing and complicated. Everything turns out to be the
opposite of what you think. What a mess. How can you know what is correct and what is not.
What is truth, say, and what is false?” (Ben-Ner, 1989, p. 47). This can also be found in
Refuge (Hasut) by Michael (1977) when “Fatkhi… has long since learned that his future
brother-in-law believed his own lies” (p. 48). Another such example can be given from the
movie Time for Cherries (Onat Haduvdevanim) in which the story of the conflict goes
through three different filters in order to be told: it is seen through the eyes of an international
news crew who have come to tell the story of the war. They choose to follow an advertising
copywriter who has been mobilized as a military reservist and who confuses himself, the
crew, and the audience about the question of what is reality, what is news, and what is an
advertisement.
Consequently the conflict is seen in these texts as a never-ending event that can be
understood as a fairy tale or through undermining the credibility of a particular narrative, but
not as reality. While Israeli ethos of conflict and public perception of the time started to see it
as a conflict that can be rationally understood and even solved, the texts produced a different
narrative. More than anything else, these texts of the 1980s tell a story of not being able to
tell a story; a story about a fictional-reality that is too complicated to grasp and understand.
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2. Many of the characters in these texts lose their minds, get hospitalized in institutions
for the mentally ill, or otherwise disappear from society. For example, in Ta’atu’on a
strange and noisome odor comes from Holy, the protagonist, who serves as an Israeli
soldier in the Palestinian territories which Israel occupies. Only after he is forced to
take a shower it is understood that this smell – symbolizing the situation as a whole –
cannot be changed, and he is hospitalized in an institution for the mentally ill. Shortly
afterward, another soldier from his unit, Michael, is also hospitalized there. The other
two main characters of the novel have no better future: Holy’s father disappears,
while the forth character gets fired and his end is likewise unknown. A few other
examples of the same phenomena are: Chava and Kita, a daughter and her mother,
both lose their minds and die in A Good Arab (Aravi Tov) by Kaniuk (1984). In
almost every movie about the Lebanon war, like Ricochet (Shtei Etzbaot mitzidon)
and Time for Cherries, some of the Israeli soldiers become mentally unstable. In The
Smile of the Lamb the Arab Hilmi completely mixes fiction and reality, he lives in an
almost imagined world of his own, which distances him from his society. But this
made-up world of his is the reason that the Israeli officer Uri tries to connect with him
and learn how to leave in a world that is detached from reality.
Based on Foucault’s Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of
Reason (1965), Benziman (2011) claims that the societies that continue to function despite
painful conflicts should be questioned, and not the characters who are unable to live a normal
life in them: the mentally ill, who are removed from them, seem to be messengers of the
insight that it is the conflict itself that is insane and that people cannot contain it. The fact that
these societies seem to function in the midst of the conflict and to expel those who try to
convey a message about its terrible effects can provide better testimony about the conflict
than about the characters that, understandably, cannot live in a reality full of hatred and
violence. Therefore, the majority of texts dealing with the conflict at the 1980s, while
presenting characters that lose their minds, actually tell us something about the conflict which
is crazy, illogical, and not understandable, in which normal people cannot live. This, once
again, is in contrast to growing tendencies in Israel at the time to understand the conflict, put
sense into it, rationalize it, and understand how it can be solved in a logical and rational way.
3. The texts tell a story in which the conflict is not only tragic but also offers no
optimistic future hope. All these texts have bad, tragic and unhappy endings. In
almost every text that deals with the conflict in the 1980s, death is an important
Volume 21, Number 1

15

Peace and Conflict Studies
factor. The Israeli soldier Alex of A Trumpet in the Wadi dies as he goes to war.
While going to fight against his lover’s brothers he is killed, leaving the Arab Huda
pregnant and not knowing how she will be able to raise a half-Jewish/half-Arab baby
(Michael, 1987). In A Good Arab, Chava, supposedly a national hero, dies when she
takes the wheel from her peace-seeking Arab husband and roles their car over
(Kaniuk, 1984). Yuad in The Secret Life of Saeed the Pessoptimist by Emile Habibi
(1984), Katzman in The Smile of The Lamb (Grossman, 1983), the child Anton
Shammas in Arabesques (Shammas, 1986), Khaled in the movie Heat-Wave
(Hamsin), Rauf in Ricochet, almost all the Arab characters in the movie Cup Final,
and more – all die.
The crucial role assumed by death is not only evidence of the horrors of the conflict,
but also of the inability to end it. The texts tell a story in which the conflict is not only tragic
but also offers no future hope. The authors, screenplay writers, and filmmakers could, at least
theoretically, have written texts with happy endings. They are, one should remember, not
obligated to the “truth” or to a mimetic representation of the conflict; yet they all chose to end
their texts with death, tragedy and no hope. While Israelis started to see how at least parts of
the conflict can be resolved, the texts told stories in which conflict does not end, not even
when the texts’ producers have the liberty to choose any ending they want.
4. Jewish and Arab characters in these texts cannot establish normal relationships or
romantic relationships in Israel/Palestine. The characters can have such relationships
outside the holy land, but not in it. Anyone who is seen as too close to someone from
the out-group is immediately condemned. The only places in which Jewish and Arab
protagonists do meet in these texts are, therefore, outside of Israel or in extraterritorial Heterotopian venues (Foucault, 1997) such as hospitals, isolated spots, or
mental institutions. For example, A Good Arab tells a story in which individuals from
the opposing sides can be friends and lovers outside of Israel but not in it. In
Germany, the Arab Azuri is involved in a love-triangle with the Jewish couple Kita
and Franz. It ends when they arrive in Israel. Azuri meets Kita and Franz’s daughter,
Chava, and they marry, but are unsuccessful in establishing a normal life in Israel and
so they move to France; when they return to Israel their relationship fails again. Their
son, Yosef, half-Arab--half-Jew, fails in establishing any kind of intimate relationship,
either with Jews or with Arabs (Kaniuk, 1984).
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It seems as if it is only by physically distancing themselves from the conflict can
Arabs and Jews meet and establish some kind of dialogue. Likewise, most of the texts that
narrate love stories between Jews and Arabs have an unhappy ending with the relationship
breaking off. Significantly, when a relationship takes place outside Israel—it prevails.
In the movie A Narrow Bridge (Gesher tzar meod), the love story between Laila, a
Palestinian widow, and an Israeli officer ends when she leaves for Jordan due to societal
pressure. In Heat-Wave, Chava’s brother releases an ox that kills her Arab boyfriend, Halad.
In Arabesques, (Shammas, 1986) the Jewish writer Yosh Bar-On gets acquainted with an
Arab-Israeli and a Palestinian only when staying in Paris and in the United States. In The
Smile of the Lamb the Israeli officer Uri and the Arab Hilmi have an equal status that can
permit a dialog only when Uri comes to Hilmi’s isolated cave (Grossman, 1983). In
Ta’atu’on, the place where Palestinians and Israelis meet in order to try and have a dialogue
is an institution for the mentally ill (Ben-Ner, 1989). In the movie Fictitious Marriage the
only place where the Palestinian workers and the Jewish protagonist can meet is in a
construction site (significantly, not a constructed house, for example). Likewise, in A
Trumpet in the Wadi, the love story between Alex and Huda does not take place in a house
but in the attic (Michael, 1987).
The Contradiction
When comparing the Israeli cultural texts of the time and the Israeli psychological
repertoire and ethos of conflict of the time – one can see that they do not go in the same
directions. Although both changing at about the same time, and undoubtedly influencing one
another, they do not share the same characteristics of change.
The most revealing fact is that while Israeli public discourse showed a reduction in
viewing the conflict as a zero-sum-game, the texts do not: they end in death, the protagonists
lose their minds, and no chance for a positive future is presented. The dialogues are not
between equals and – according to the cultural texts of the time – the only place where Jews
and Arabs can meet and sustain a normal relationship is outside of Israel/Palestine.
The most important trait of these texts is that they tell a story of not being able to tell
a story and so the texts are confusing. They deal almost obsessively with the questions of
what is true or false and question what is reality and what is not. At the same time, though,
the perceptions of Israelis about the conflict changed after the peace treaty with Egypt and the
new belief that there is a rational way to understand the conflict and even to solve it. The
concept of Land for Peace, proven to be a solution, was a way of understanding the conflict
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rationality and it proposed a way to end it (Ben Porat, 2008) which brought optimism to the
public discourse (Oren, 2009) while the fictional texts told exactly the opposite story: no
rationality, telling the story of the inability to understand it, showing no future hope and no
Jewish-Arab relations that prevails in the conflicted land.
While Israeli public opinion towards Arabs transformed, it included less stereotypes
and prejudices (Smooha, 1998; Stone, 1983), Israel’s literature was Orientalistic even when
trying to present a more balanced perspective of the Arab (Oppenheimer, 2008). The texts
continued to present the Israeli-national narrative, even when the overall picture is not one of
black and white.
The texts deal with almost all of the topics that comprise the inter-group
psychological repertoire and the ethos of conflict – security, self-identification, group
belongings and more – but show them in a different light than the public discourse of the
time. Why is it, then, that while Israeli society’s beliefs became more exceptive of other
narratives and less pessimistic, the cultural texts became more confusing? Why is it that
while the texts did become consistent with the public discourse by giving more voice to the
Arab other, they at the same time told a story in which there actually cannot be any
coexistence between Arabs and Jews, Israelis and Palestinians? How is it that these texts
actually told a story that might not have been the story of Israeli public discourse of the 1980s
but certainly reflects the Israeli discourse after the year 2000?
These findings challenge the well-known concept that cultural texts are part of the
narrative of societies in conflict. They show that while both cultural texts and political public
discourse changed at the same time – they went in different directions. The cultural texts
were more pessimistic and confused than the public discourse. Interestingly enough, although
not completely in line with the discourse back in the 1980s, they – in a way – present a
picture similar to what would become the Israeli ethos of conflict two decades later. After the
year 2000, the Israeli perception and ethos of conflict included beliefs about the inability to
have a dialog with the Palestinians; a perception that there is “no partner” in the rival side;
belief that the conflict cannot be solved as Israel has done extensive efforts to do so but could
not strike a peace agreement; total confusion about the question of how to end the conflict, as
all the efforts done did not prevail; perception that peace treaties signed outside of Israel
(Oslo or Geneva for example) can only last outside of Israel-Palestine but collapse in the
middle-eastern reality; beliefs that people who were talking about a peace-agreement, a “new
middle east” and a coexistence between Israelis and Arabs were day-dreaming or living in a
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fantasy world that is not connected to reality. All these are, of course, much closer to what
Israeli novels and films of the 1980s showed than to the ethos of conflict of the 1980s in
which they were produced.
Potential Explanations
Various explanations can be given to this gap between the ethos of conflict and the
psychological inter-group repertoire, and the way cultural fictional texts present the conflict. I
would like to suggest three explanations, not necessarily competing ones – and sometimes
even overlapping – although many more can be thought of:
1. Fictional texts can present a different perspective of conflicts than the one shared by
society because they are not obligated to a mimetic representation of the conflict.
Their fictionality allows them to tell different stories and they show a more
complicated picture of the conflict. Their role, as being part of society but also outside
of it because of their fictionality, gives them more freedom in their ability to deal with
the conflict. It allows them to produce works that are not consistent with what their
audiences are used to hearing, reading or seeing – and to still be appreciated and
loved. And so, they are capable of being much more critical of the national narrative
and the ethos of conflict, and might even foresee future events just because they are
based on the imagination of their producers.
In the case study discussed above, although the real conflict transformed at the time
and so did the public opinion (Oren, 2010), the cultural texts – while going through dramatic
changes – did not go with the flow. Although changing the representation of the Arab
characters (Ben-Ezer, 1999; Orian, 1996; Shohat, 1991), although challenging the dichotomy
between Jews and Arabs (Gertz, 1993), although presenting a more multi-layered perspective
of the conflict (Benziman, 2011) – their essence is actually rooted in viewing the conflict as a
dead-end one, which was the basic understanding of the conflict in Israeli society before the
1980s and came back to be the main belief of Israeli society after the year 2000.
2. Fictional texts do not present claims or positions. They tell stories which can be
interpreted in a variety of ways. One reader or scholar can understand them in one
way and the other in another. They also, as mentioned, contain different layers to
them. And so the text can at the same time contain elements of the ethos of conflict
and criticize the national narrative, they can preserve the ethos while presenting
crucial variations from it. Knowing that conflicts influence the way individuals and
societies understand and perceive information (see for example Markus & Zajonc,
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1985) – it is fair to believe that while the texts contain a complex view of a conflict,
the audience sees only parts of it. For example, while a text can show that characters
of both sides are to blame – the reader might only see that one side is to blame.
Therefore, texts can be canonical, mainstream and loved by their society just because
they can be interpreted differently and because different people and different portions
of society understand them in different ways. In practice, the members of society
reading or watching them might perceive these texts as strengthening their beliefs, as
proving their cases, and as enforcing their perspectives – even if the texts have other
(more controversial) sides to them as well.
In the case studied above, it is fair to believe that the change in the representation of
Arab characters went in the path of changes of Israelis perception of Arabs (Oren, 2009;
Smooha, 1998). But the readers did not notice that this supposed change still keeps the texts’
Orientalistic approach (Oppenheimer, 2008).
3. There are certain elements in these texts that do correspond with the ethos of conflict
and psychological inter-group repertoire. Even when presenting a different
perspective, these cultural texts do share common elements with the public discourse.
For example, the pessimistic endings of the texts discussed above do not show a light
at the end of a tunnel for society or a brighter future as the Israeli public started to perceive it.
But at the same time, their unhappy endings are completely logical and reasonable for a
society that at this decade went through two wars that were on-going and without a clear
ending (The Lebanon War and the Intifada). Likewise, their confusion and their tendency to
deal with the fact that they cannot deal with the conflict does not present an illuminated
picture of the conflict which could help members of the in-group understand the conflict and
provide a coherent picture of it (see, for example: Burton, 1990); however, they might
comfort the audiences’ feeling of misunderstanding and show them a fictional-reality in
which the confusion does not make the situation wrong or weaken society’s national
narrative.
It is possible that in this specific conflict, texts which say out loud that the conflict is
unresolved and problematic, and which do not wholeheartedly support one side, but at the
same time still retain elements of the national narrative – are the kind of national texts which
preserve the culture of conflict. And so, although not completely consistent with
expectations, cultural texts do have some characteristics which are part of the culture of
conflict. These are difficult to generalize and almost impossible to make inductive
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conclusions from because they differ from one case study to the other, but they still have
some elements which actually align with the national narrative and the psychological intergroup repertoire of each specific society.
Conclusion
Fiction novels, art works, theatre plays, films and other cultural texts sometimes tell
stories which differ from the way societies in conflict perceive and understand the conflict in
which they live. Fictional cultural texts – by their mere characteristics – tell a more complex
and multi-layered story about conflicts than other kinds of discourses. This study is a first
step in identifying the contradiction between cultural texts and the discourse they produce on
the one hand, and the ethos of conflict and culture of conflict on the other hand. Three
different explanations were given to try to understand this contradiction: it could be that the
fictionality of these texts enables them to be appreciated and still tell a different story than
what society expects; it might be that they are not fully understood by society; and it might be
that portions of them do align with parts of the in-group narrative. Maybe all is true. Yet
much more research has to be done in order to understand how these texts can be at the same
time canonical mainstream texts in a society, and tell a different story from the typical ethos
of conflict narrative shared by it.
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The Role of Youth in Post Accord Transformation in Northern Ireland
Christine Smith Ellison
Abstract
Despite increased international interest in the contribution of education to peacebuilding,
there has been a neglect of the role that non-formal youth programming can play in this
process. This article examines three such youth programmes in post-accord Northern Ireland
through the theoretical lens of their contribution to social, economic and political
transformations. Given the sustained context of segregation and limitations of the formal
education sector as a mechanism for transformation, the paper argues that the non-formal
sector has played an important role in ensuring inclusion of multiple youth perspectives in a
divided society. It also raises a number of critical questions regarding the politics of multiple
youth representation and the strength of genuine commitment to peacebuilding in terms of
conflict transformation.

Introduction
The past decade has seen a growing recognition of the role that education plays in
both fuelling conflict and contributing to processes of peacebuilding. This has been driven
by the push to fulfil the education-related Millennium Development Goals. The focus on
basic education for all (EFA) has arguably led not only to a neglect of the contribution nonformal education makes to peacebuilding, but also to the role of youth. Despite recent
disturbances, Northern Ireland is often seen as a peacebuilding success and, fifteen years
post-agreement, this paper examines the role of non-formal youth programming in
peacebuilding. It begins by outlining developments over the past decade in the field of
education and conflict, before highlighting the need to prioritise youth analysis in situations
of conflict. It then provides a synthesis of the international research evidence on the linkages
between youth, education and conflict. The second half of the article employs this theoretical
framework to examine three youth programmes and their contribution to social, economic
and political transformations in post-accord Northern Ireland. The paper argues that the nonformal sector has played an important role in ensuring inclusion of multiple youth
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perspectives in a divided society where structural education reform is not yet a politically
viable option. It also raises a number of critical questions regarding the politics of multiple
youth representation and the strength of genuine commitment to peacebuilding in terms of
conflict transformation.
Education, Conflict and Peacebuilding
The field of education and conflict emerged as a topic of concern due to its
significance for the achievement of the education-related Millennium Development Goals.
Over the course of the past two decades academics and donors have explored the ‘two faces’
of education and its role in both fuelling and mitigating conflict. An important study by Bush
and Saltarelli (2000) drew on a number of international examples to highlight different forms
of violence in education: “The negative face shows itself in the uneven distribution of
education to create or preserve privilege, the use of education as a weapon of cultural
repression, and the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance” (2000, p. 7).
Subsequent studies have discussed the multiple ways that schools systems might reproduce
social and gender inequalities that may be a catalyst for war (Davies, 2004).
On the other hand, academics have examined the ways in which education can
contribute positively to peace. Perhaps the most obvious way in which education may do this
is through peace education programs. These programs have a wide variety of goals ranging
from what Marc Ross (2000) has called ‘good enough conflict management’, in other words
some level of mutual understanding and reduction in violence, through to programs that aim
to attain the legitimization of the other side's perspective (Salomon, 2007). In a review of
quasi-experimental studies carried out with Israeli-Jewish and Palestinian youth Salomon
argues that peace education can produce more views of peace, better ability to see the other
side's perspective, and greater willingness for contact. Perhaps most interestingly he also
finds that in the context of protracted conflict these programs can play a preventative role in
blocking the further deterioration of inter-group relations following adverse events outside
the confines of the program.
More recently there has also been a shift towards examining the role education can
play in explicitly contributing to processes of peacebuilding and conflict transformation. The
concept of peacebuilding originated in the field of peace studies in the work of Johan Galtung
(1976) who argued that peacebuilding “has a structure different from, perhaps over and
above, peacekeeping and ad hoc peacemaking” (1976, p. 297). In particular, he introduced
the distinction between negative peace (the absence of violence) and positive peace (the
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absence of structural violence and the conditions for war) and highlighted the importance of
local knowledge and participation. Another key scholar in the field, John Paul Lederach
(1997), expanded our understanding of the concept. He sees peacebuilding as a dynamic
social process and introduced the term conflict transformation which he defines as an
“ongoing process of change from negative to positive relations, behaviour, attitudes and
structures” (1997, p. 20). Key to this process are relationships: “Cultivating an ‘infrastructure
for peacebuilding’ means that “we are not merely interested in ‘ending’ something that is not
desired. We are oriented toward the building of relationships that in their totality form new
patterns, processes, and structures” (1997, pp. 84-85).
Education for peacebuilding is therefore oriented towards the transformation of the
structural conditions and social relations that generate violent conflict. This may include the
role that access to education can play in addressing group inequalities, the importance of
education sector reform in encouraging new forms of power relations and the potential for
education to support transformation processes related to security sector reform, political
institutions, economic regeneration and social development (Smith, 2011).
The recent UNESCO Global Monitoring Report (2011) calls for an increased role for
education in peacebuilding and, in particular, for the resources available through the United
Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) to be increased to between $500 million and $1 billion a
year. Whilst the report argues for early engagement and prioritization of education
throughout all conflict phases, there is no critical analysis of the way in which non-formal
education, particularly for youth, can contribute to these processes.
Why Prioritise Youth?
The definition of “youth” is highly contested and there is a lot of variation in the age
ranges used by international organisations. The United Nations (UN) defines those aged
between 15 and 24 as youth; this is the most common age range used, and is advocated by the
UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, the UN Development
Programme (UNDP), and the International Youth Foundation. However, defining youth in
terms of chronological age is arguably even less appropriate in conflict situations than
elsewhere. Youth are often thrust into adult roles earlier than would otherwise be the case in
times of peace. They may, for example, find themselves heading households in the event of
parental death and displacement. Conflict also causes difficulties for the socio-cultural
definition of youth since the traditional markers of the transition into adulthood are often
disrupted. A more appropriate way of understanding youth is as a transitional stage in life
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between childhood and adulthood. This allows for the exploration of the specific factors that
determine the transition into adulthood in different contexts (Hilker & Fraser, 2009, p. 9).
Partly due to the complexity of defining the category, youth are often overlooked.
However, there are a number of reasons why it is essential to consider youth as distinct actors
in conflict situations. First, youth are disproportionately affected by conflict. The past
fifteen years have seen increasing recognition of the negative impacts of conflict on youth.
Disruption to schooling means that they miss out on the physical, psychosocial and cognitive
protection that education provides (UNESCO, 2011). Reports also indicate that youth are
increasingly on the front line of armed conflicts, with classrooms, teachers and students seen
as legitimate targets (O’Malley, 2010).
Youth are also likely to be represented in the ranks of armed groups and state armies.
Here there are two sets of literature. The first relates to the forced recruitment of child
soldiers and espouses the need for protective measures. The UN Secretary General’s report
to the Security Council, covering fifteen countries, identifies fifty-seven groups recruiting
child soldiers (United Nations, 2010). The second relates to the “threat” posed by older,
mostly male youth who are thought to be easily mobilised by rebel leaders. This is related to
an increasing demonization of youth in the media (for critique of this see Hendrixson, 2004;
Sommers, 2006). However, it does reflect the reality that youth “provide much of the crucial
energy and mass power to get wheels turning for divergent ‘vehicles’ of social and political
change” (Hamilton, 2010, p. 4).
Second, youth are often key actors in peacebuilding. As McEvoy-Levy (2001) writes,
In any conflict context one examines, the dominant presence of the young in youth
work, in community development, and in inter-ethnic and dialogue and peace
groups is clear. Many have direct experience of violence, conflict and
imprisonment themselves. They are not well paid, their projects are under-funded,
often stressful and can be life threatening. Like other civil society actors they are
less visible in analysis of peace processes than key elites. (pp. 24-25)
As the “primary actors in grassroots community development/relations work”
McEvoy-Levy argues youth are “at the frontlines of peacebuilding” (2001, p. 24). However,
for many years policymakers and scholars have not adequately explored the positive
contribution made by youth. This shortfall is starting to be acknowledged by some. The
2007 World Development Report of the World Bank, for example, focused attention on the
needs and transformative potential of “the next generation” in development, but much of the
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literature remains ad hoc and descriptive, missing out on the potential to learn from the
experience of many youth peacebuilders around the world.
Finally, youth is a period –whether defined by chronological age or socially
constructed roles- during which individuals undergo a number of important transitions. It is a
difficult period under the best circumstances. During times of conflict, however, many youth
can be stuck in “waithood” (Singerman, 2007, p. 6), unable to make the transition into
adulthood. As just one example, unemployment often affects youth more than any other
group. The frustrations that this generates and the effects can last well beyond the end of
war. Youth in situations of conflict therefore have specific needs that require analysis and
attention. Furthermore, as Hamilton points out, “Youth voices tend to go unheard by political
and economic leaders (even by social scientists) unless they are raised as a revolutionary cry
or as an articulated threat to the social order” (2010, p. 7).
Youth, Education and Conflict: The Theory
Overall the evidence suggests that youth get involved in violence for multiple and
diverse reasons, which need to be understood in each specific context. In practice, there is
usually no one singular reason why a particular young person participates in violence.
Different individuals may join the same violent group for different reasons (see for example
Weinstein & Humphreys, 2008). There are, however, three broad approaches in the literature
to examining the linkages between education youth and conflict: social/cultural, economic,
and political.
Social and Cultural Theory
One hypothesis is that conflict is generated out of grievances based on “horizontal
inequalities”, defined as inequalities in economic, social or political dimensions or cultural
status between culturally defined groups (Stewart, 2008). This is especially the case where
the inequalities have perceived “social significance”. Gurr (1970) adds that even in contexts
where the data shows no evidence of inequalities, there may be an increased risk of conflict
where there is perceived “relative deprivation” between groups. Opinion is divided on
whether the existence of different identity-based groups (linguistic, cultural, religious) carries
an inherent potential for conflict. Although the view that cultural differences are the root
cause of violent conflict underpins concepts such as “a clash of civilizations” (Huntington,
1996), Stewart argues that identity is important as it may be mobilized to generate or escalate
conflict.
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Given the role that identity plays in mobilisation for violence, there are implications
for youth education programming. Over the past decade there has been increased recognition
of the fact that education can be provided in a way that either promotes the peaceful
management of diversity or be an instrument by which divisions are exacerbated, potentially
providing the basis for conflict. Careful thought needs to be given to issues such as the
language of instruction; values transferred through the curriculum and, in particular, the way
young people are taught about the country’s past; and the ideological orientation of the
education system. The Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE) has
recently developed a Conflict Sensitive guideline to help integrate these issues into education
policy and programming (INEE, 2013).
Attention should also be paid to equality issues between groups within society,
especially in terms of access to education, resource inputs, and actual and perceived benefits
to different groups in terms of education outcomes. It is also important to understand the
social significance of education for different communities. Stewart (2008) highlights that the
social significance can lie either in an element’s innate value or in its instrumentality for
achieving other goals, such as incomes and wellbeing. This point seems particularly relevant
with regards the role of education. It is certainly the case that some minority groups not only
have lower access to education, but also lower returns on their education. It is not difficult to
imagine this to be a source of grievance in a context where education is valued as a means of
social mobility.
Economic Theory
One economic hypothesis argues that youth participation in conflict occurs when it is
financially viable and profitable. It is based mainly on research by Collier and Hoeffler
(2000, 2004), who used three main proxies to measure the opportunity cost of participating in
civil conflict across a number of countries. The first two proxies were mean income per
capita (a population with high income may have more to lose from conflict) and growth rate
of the economy (with high growth there are more employment opportunities). The third proxy
indicator was the male secondary school enrolment rate. Collier and Hoeffler argued that
young males are the group from which rebels are most recruited, the number of years of
secondary education affects earning potential, and therefore having more years of schooling
is likely to affect the opportunity cost of participating in conflict. Other studies have found
similar results regarding this protective nature of secondary education (Barakat & Urdal,
2009; Thyne, 2006).
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However, this theory has also received criticism for being dependent on strong links
between the education and labour markets, which is often not the case. For example, Urdal
(2006) argues that when countries respond to large youth cohorts by expanding access to
higher education, this may result in a much larger group of highly educated young people
than the labour market is able to absorb. High levels of unemployment among highly
educated youth may cause frustration that could lead to grievances and incidence of violence.
In fact, Choucri (1974) argues that high unemployment among educated youth is one of the
most destabilising forces a state can face.
In addition, this theory characterizes ‘greed’ as the main driver of conflict, and has
been challenged as overly simplistic and dependent on a rational choice theory of human
behaviour (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003). Some authors argue there are other explanations
for the mitigating effect of education on conflict that remain to be explored. These range
from the values that quality education transmits, the evidence it gives of a government’s
ability to provide for its citizens, through to the role it plays in simply keeping young people
occupied. Although opinions are divided on the mechanisms by which education and
political violence interact, the literature highlights the need for education programming to
focus on secondary education for youth in and out of school, the role of technical and
vocational education, and the relevance of education to employment opportunities and
economic development.
Political Theory
While the greed and grievance perspectives examine the reasons why youth take up
arms, the third approach critically examines the nature of the politics that “prepared the field”
(Bates, 2008, p. 131) for conflict. Bates argues that ruling elites in many countries postindependence have been driven by the need to maintain a political power base by
concentrating resources on a narrow section of the population, rather than developing policies
to provide social goods such as education as a wider benefit for all. Drawing on examples
from sub-Saharan Africa, Bates argues that post-independence elections were costly and
incumbents preserved their position through the distribution of public goods. As it became
too expensive to continue in this manner, ruling elites moved towards an authoritarian
regime. Under this system, providing the constituency with public goods, including
education, was no longer important. The goal of both incumbents and political opponents
alike was to garner the favour of ruling elites, on which their chance of success and being
included in the narrowing “private distribution” of material benefits depended. This
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centralised, closed and regulated economy was costly and in the long run meant a decrease in
public revenue and less rewards from public services. This further entrenched the status of
rulers as “predators”. Eventually, citizens react to this behaviour of their rulers by taking up
arms.
Bates (2008) documents the ways in which rational (self-interested), political
decision-making by elites can lead to the demise of the social contract. The past decade’s
emphasis on liberal peacebuilding, with a focus on early electoral and market reform, has
received criticism on the grounds that it serves the interests of elites and does little to address
the underlying causes of conflict. This is certainly one of the criticisms of the peace process
in Northern Ireland where, despite a halt in overt conflict, tensions between communities are
still apparent (Knox, 2010; Leonard & McKnight, 2012). In particular, a number of authors
have noted a sense of alienation among young people and frustration that peace has not
delivered on its promises of a better life.
The implication is that there is a need for programmes that promote wider political
engagement of youth in understanding and participating in the political systems that operate
within their communities. There is a well-established body of evidence that shows that
greater levels of schooling increase political participation (Bénabou, 2000; Dee, 2004;
Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993). Civic education has been
shown to increase young people’s understanding of their political systems and environment,
although effort must be made to ensure that this translates into action and political
participation. Research also indicates that it is important to engage young people early as
they are unlikely to become more interested in politics with age (Institute for Conflict
Research, 2005). In the case of Northern Ireland it is especially important to engage this
section of society as they will be tasked with managing the decision on the sovereignty of
their country.
Education and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland
th

On 10 April 1998, the negotiations that resulted in the Good Friday Agreement were
finally concluded. Thirty years of violence had resulted in 3,600 people being killed, more
than half of whom were civilians, and 30,000 injured. Fifty-three percent of those killed were
under 30 years old (Fay, Morrissey, & Smyth, 1999). The agreement involved the
establishment of cross-border bodies with executive powers set up by the Irish and British
governments, a Northern Irish Assembly based on power-sharing, support for victims of the
‘Troubles’ and the early release of paramilitary prisoners. The British and Irish governments
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recognised “the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be
accepted as Irish or British or both” and the agreement accepted that the future constitutional
status of the territory will be determined by “the wish of the majority of the people who live
there” (Northern Ireland Office, 1998).
Fifteen years after The Agreement peace is increasingly well established and the
former UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has claimed that “the lessons of peace and
reconciliation in Northern Ireland can be learned in other conflicts across the world” (Blair,
2008). The European Union, a longstanding and major actor in the peace process, has held up
its role in peacebuilding in Northern Ireland as an opportunity for lesson-learning and
modelling as it seeks to expand its capacity for conflict prevention, management and
resolution (Tonra, 2011). However, a number of issues remain capable of stalling progress in
Northern Ireland (see Fitzduff & O’Hagan, 2009); most recently the flags dispute that began
in December 2012 is evidence of a deep alienation within a section of the unionist
community from the peace settlement that has emerged (Nolan, 2013). Perhaps most
crucially, as Smith (2010) argues, The Agreement deferred a decision on the ultimate
sovereignty of the territory: “the agreement managed to ‘transform’ the conflict, but the
dispute has not been ‘resolved’” (2010, p. 58).
Of particular interest to this study is the role that education and employment linkages
played in the lead up to the period of conflict known as the Troubles. When Ireland was
partitioned in 1921 the six counties in the North-East became known as Northern Ireland and
remained part of the United Kingdom, whilst the other 26 counties gained independence as
the Republic of Ireland. At the time Protestant Unionists made up two thirds of the
population of Northern Ireland and the state was described by its first prime minister as
having “a Protestant Parliament for a Protestant people” (Fitzduff & O’Hagan, 2009, p. 3).
The evidence available shows that systematic inequalities in many dimensions persisted for
the first fifty years of the newly created Northern Ireland state. The Catholic unemployment
rate was 2.6 times the Protestant rate in 1917 and the same in 1971 (McGarry & O’Leary,
1995). There has been much research into the causes of the employment differential and a
comprehensive review is provided by Gallagher (1991). Since 1812 and the formation of
Catholic schools, Northern Ireland’s education system has been effectively segregated along
religious lines. One explanation for the employment differential therefore relates to lower
academic achievement: data shows Catholic disadvantage in admission to grammar schools
and O and A-level achievements up to the mid-1970s (Stewart & Langar, 2007, p. 21). In
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addition, Catholic school leavers were less likely to have qualifications in scientific and
technological subjects. These issues were visible in the civil rights riots in the 1960s.
Significant progress has been made in reducing these inequalities through the
introduction of a common curriculum and the 1976 and 1989 Fair Employment Acts (Stewart
& Langar, 2007). The recent Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report finds that “those
who have entered the labour market operate on a level playing field and amongst the older
age cohorts the numbers of Catholics and Protestants who are unemployed are proportionate
to their population size” (Nolan, 2013, p. 8). However, it also notes that “the growth of youth
unemployment has opened up a new communal differential: 20% of Catholics aged 18-24 are
unemployed as opposed to 15% of Protestants” (p. 8). Further, whilst progress has been
made with regards to equality of educational outcomes, the system remains highly
segregated. Education is mentioned twice in the Good Friday Agreement, once in relation to
support for the development of integrated schools and once in relation to support for Irish
language education. However, recent figures indicate that almost half of Northern Ireland’s
school children are still being taught in schools where 95% or more of the pupils are of the
same religion (Hansson, O’Connor-Bones, & McCord, 2013, p. 47).
Peacebuilding in Practice: Non-formal Youth Education in Northern Ireland
The previous section has highlighted the contribution of education to peacebuilding in
terms of social, economic and political transformation. This provides a theoretical
framework for the analysis of three youth programmes that have been implemented in postagreement Northern Ireland.
Recent data from the 2011 census indicates that there are 227,634 youth in Northern
Ireland between the ages of 16 and 24, making up 12.6% of the population. As in many cases
elsewhere, youth in Northern Ireland have suffered in the context of the current economic
crisis. Between November 2007-August 2010 the number of unemployed young people (24
years and younger) increased by 171%, compared to 145% in the general population. There
was an even more dramatic rise in the percentage of young people experiencing long term
unemployment of more than a year, with the figure increasing by 688% from July 2008 to
July 2010. More recent evidence from the Labour Force Survey (Department of Enterprise,
Trade and Investment, 2013) also identified 42,000 young people Not in Education,
Employment or Training (NEETs).
At the same time there is evidence that youth are switching off from politics. In a
survey of 1434 sixteen year olds 62% of sixteen year olds responded that they had “not very
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much” or no interest at all in politics (Young Life and Times Survey, 2011). They also
represent the age group that is the least likely to vote. A recent opinion poll found that 52%
of the 18-24 year olds said that they would not bother voting compared with 40% of the 4564 age-group, and 38% of the 65+ age-group (Belfast Telegraph, 2013).
On a more positive note, there are signs from a small sample survey of 15-21 year
olds that young people are supportive of greater sharing and integration across many different
aspects of education, relationships, culture and social/physical regeneration (Ellis, McNeill,
Erskine, & O’Sullivan, 2013). For example, over 90% of respondents supported greater levels
of contact between the communities and 64% of respondents indicated that they would prefer
to be educated in a mixed environment rather than a segregated one. One issue on which the
respondents were divided relates to the aspiration either to stay in Northern Ireland (53%) or
seek a better future elsewhere (47%).
Social Transformation
Research has highlighted the role that identity and social values play in mobilisation
for violence. As a result there are many examples of youth peacebuilding programmes based
on the idea that intercultural exchanges lead to reduced prejudice and improved relations
between groups (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1976; Maoz, 2002; Trew, 1986). One example of such
programmes is the Children’s Friendship Project for Northern Ireland (CFPNI) which was
established with the aim of promoting understanding through interaction. It ran from 1987
until 2007 when the organisation directed its activities into the creation of an Alumni Group
of past participants. The project has its origin in the many “holiday schemes” of the 1980s
which allowed children from both the Catholic and Protestant communities to travel to the
United States for a few weeks during the summer months. Over 2,500 young people
participated in the CFPNI programme that included a four-week stay in the United States
with a host family along with organised pre and post “holiday” programmes. Activities
varied, but included participation in community service and volunteer schemes and cultural
and teambuilding activities, concentrating on leadership and conflict resolution (Irish Times,
2007). However, the main focus was on the building of a friendship and a key requirement
was that both the youth participants from the two major traditions in Northern Ireland had to
share a room for the duration of their stay with the American host family.
The impact of these programmes has been the subject of much research across a
number of contexts (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Horenczyk & Bekerman, 1997).
According to the contact hypothesis on which these types of programmes are based, four key
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conditions are necessary for inter-group contact to be beneficial (Pettigrew, 1998). The
groups should have equal group status, work towards common goals, be able to cooperate
with each other without intergroup competition and the contact should have the support of the
relevant authorities or customs. The literature also highlights that important consideration
should be given to the management of anxiety which accompanies inter-group contact
(Hewstone, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998). An evaluation of CFPNI by Stringer and MurphyCowan (2008) finds that:
the programme follows the key steps suggested by leading contact researchers.
During the first stage cross community friendships are encouraged in a safe and
anxiety free Northern Irish environment and friendships are given time to develop
in the more religiously neutral USA context. During this initial stage relationships
are also supported by important authority figures (parents, group co-ordinators and
host families) providing essential support for cross group contacts. (p. 5)
A common criticism of holiday schemes relates to a lack of follow up events in order
to maintain friendships across the groups (Stringer & Cairns, 1992). It is argued that the
impact can only be limited given the challenges of maintaining friendships once participants
have returned to their everyday lives in a strongly divided society. Interestingly, this is
something which CFPNI aimed to tackle. First, a key requirement in pairing up participants
was that they must live within a few miles of each other. Parents were also actively involved
in the process and had to agree to meet up at least once for a pre-departure program as well as
agreeing to attend the follow-up program (Harroun, 2009). In particular, the project put a
strong emphasis on its structured post-holiday programmes which included a reunion event
where participants, parents, a selection of host families and CFPNI volunteer coordinators
could come together to share what they had learned and experienced.
More generally, questions have been raised about the need to go beyond the level of
superficial contact towards engaging youth in understanding the root causes of conflict and
analysing power relations within society. Despite theory highlighting the importance of
intergroup inequalities, many programmes have been accused of operating at the level of
interpersonal exchange that is unlikely to have an impact on broader social, institutional and
structural change within conflict affected societies. A variety of studies have highlighted a
failure of cross-community schemes to address divisive issues (McKeown & Cairns, 2012;
Robinson & Brown, 1991). This may reflect the “avoidance culture” where there is evidence
of a reluctance to discuss religion and politics (Niens & Cairns, 2008).
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Despite some of the criticisms, recent evidence suggests that intergroup contact can
have a positive impact on attitudes between the two communities. McKeown and Cairns
(2012) highlight research from the Young Life and Times (YLT) survey that indicates that
young people aged 16 living in Northern Ireland who had attended cross-community groups
demonstrated more favourable attitudes towards the outgroup in comparison with those who
had not (Schubotz & Robinson, 2006). Data from the 2007 to 2008 YLT further indicates
that 82% of young people who had participated in a cross-community programme agreed or
strongly agreed that relations between Protestants and Catholics would be better if there were
more community relations projects (Schubotz & McCarten, 2008). They argue that despite
some of the weaknesses of some of these programmes related to the length of engagement
and depth of discourse,
the fact that participants in such programmes have volunteered to make contact
with other communities and to learn about prejudice is surely in itself a step
forward from a society who only 30 years ago was involved in violent conflict.
(McKeown & Cairns, 2012, p. 73)
Economic Transformation
In terms of the contribution of economic change to peacebuilding, the literature
highlights the importance of increasing potential livelihoods and therefore the opportunity
cost to an individual of taking part in war. One organisation with a long-standing interest in
this area is the International Fund for Ireland (IFI). The Fund was established in 1986 by the
British and Irish Governments “to promote economic and social advance and to encourage
contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and unionists throughout Ireland”
(International Fund for Ireland, 2011, p. 8). Financed by contributions from the United
States, the European Union, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, as of September 2011 the
total resources committed totalled £695 million.
One of the Fund’s longest established programmes Wider Horizons was established in
1986 to bring together young adults aged 16 to 28 years to enhance their employability. Each
project typically lasts 20 weeks and is divided into three stages. The first stage includes
training in vocational skills, conflict resolution, mutual understanding, team building and
personal development. Stage two involves work experience in destinations such as Canada,
America, Europe and South Africa and the third stage involves completing a vocational
qualification and developing job search skills on their return. Over 17,000 young people
have taken part in the programme. Whilst it has always targeted young people, the
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programme has evolved to actively target disadvantaged groups. In 1994 it was decided to
channel all resources to only one target group, “young people aged 18 to 28 years, who are
disadvantaged either socially, economically or physically, especially through poor
qualifications and poor employment prospects” (Fitzpatrick and Associates, 2008, p. 15). It
specifically aims to attract those in long-term unemployment or those who have been carers
(this links with the social disadvantage criterion). It also targets young people with a poor
employment record, and with consent, those who are in jobs that are at-risk, or are underemployed.
The peacebuilding literature highlights that what is crucial is whether training results
in increased employability. Short term programming that is not well aligned to an analysis of
labour market needs is unfortunately an all too common occurrence in the post-conflict
international literature (Ginifer, 2003; Paulson, 2009). The resulting frustration with training
that fails to deliver what it seems to promise is very problematic in terms of long term
peacebuilding. In 2010, 71% of Wider Horizons participants progressed into employment or
training. This is a positive result given that the programme specifically targets the long-term
unemployed and compares very favourably with an average of 50-55% for other employment
programmes.
The international literature on technical and vocational training indicates that the
degree of choice and flexibility that participants have with regards their training has critical
implications for their level of satisfaction and therefore the likelihood of successfully
completing the programme (Paulson, 2009). The training provision delivered through IFI
programmes has evolved to provide more choice and flexibility for participants. A realisation
that there is a need and desire for accreditation has led to a greater variety of qualifications
being offered. There is now a choice of 68 qualifications offered to Wider Horizons
participants. For example, those undertaking training in multimedia can choose between
completing a BTEC qualification III or the shorter BCS Digital Creator Certificate depending
on the time and resources they have available and their academic background and abilities.
There has also been a shift in the types of training offered in line with the changing needs of
the labour market. Much of the early training provided through Wider Horizons was in
carpentry, plumbing and hospitality and tourism. However, in recognition of a shift towards
a knowledge-based economy there has been an increase in multimedia and IT related training.
This shift towards greater choice and flexibility in vocational training is something
which is also reflected in changes in the formal sector. The Northern Ireland Council for the
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Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment (CCEA) pushed for a revision of the curriculum
and these changes were formalised in the Education (Northern Ireland) Order 2006. The
revised curriculum aims to provide a more joined-up and holistic approach, place greater
emphasis on work skills and provide greater flexibility for pupils (Department of Education
Northern Ireland, 2009). In particular, in an attempt to greater prepare students for work, the
revised curriculum requires students from 11-16 years to study “Learning for life and work”.
This includes education for employability, local and global citizenship, personal development
and home economics. There is also a greater emphasis on cross-curricular skills such as
communication, using mathematics, and using ICT. As part of this revised curriculum the
Department of Education has also started to introduce an “Entitlement Framework”, which
aims to provide students aged between 14 and 19 with a guaranteed minimum number and
range of applied (vocational) and general (academic) courses. From 2013, schools will be
required to provide students aged 14-16 years with access to a minimum of 24 courses, and
post-16 students with access to a minimum of 27 courses. At least one third of the courses
must be general and one third must be applied (Department of Education Northern Ireland,
2014).
Northern Ireland is also participating in a UK-wide programme to reform the
vocational qualification system. The aims of the new Qualifications and Credit Framework
(QCF) are to simplify the current complicated National Qualifications Framework (NQF)
by presenting qualifications in a way which is easier to understand, to recognise
more learning through the award of qualifications and to instil more flexibility into
the system through the use of units and credit awarded for achieving those units.
(Byrne. 2010, p. 31)
Every unit and qualification in the QCF has a level between Entry level and level 8 which
indicates the degree of difficulty. Every unit and qualification also has a credit value (with
one credit representing 10 hours of study). There are three types of qualifications in the
QCF: Awards (1-12 credit); Certificates (13 to 36 credits); Diplomas (37 credits or more)
(Byrne, 2010, p. 31).
What makes the Wider Horizons programme distinctive from the type of training
provided in the formal system, however, is the composition of each project group and the
holistic approach. A Wider Horizons project group typically involves 21 participants drawn
equally from the nationalist and unionist traditions in the North of Ireland and young people
from the Republic of Ireland. The Wider Horizons programme has as one of its main aims to
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encourage and support peace and reconciliation between young people from both nationalist
and unionist communities in the North and young people from the South of Ireland. The
programme employs a number of approaches to delivering Mutual Understanding, and all
offer accredited training, as well as informal and one-to-one support (see Fitzpartick and
Associates, 2008 for further details). A 2008 evaluation found clear evidence of Mutual
Understanding having been advanced. The level of cross-community and cross-border
contact among past participants up to two years after the end of the programme is 80%.
Indeed 93% of the Northern participants have maintained cross border and cross-community
contact. This was one of the highest indicators of lasting mutual understanding (Fitzpartick
and Associates, 2008, p. 6).
Political Transformation
The research literature has highlighted the importance of promoting political
engagement among youth. The WIMPS (Where is My Public Servant?) project was founded
in Belfast in 2004 by the non-profit organisation Public Achievement. Public Achievement
staff work with the young people through their ‘Civic Youth Work’ model (VeLure Roholt,
2005; VeLure Roholt, Hildreth, & Baizerman, 2009), encouraging them to take action on
issues they identify as important. Participants are also trained in journalism and media skills
to enable them to research and create interviews and articles, and produce video and audio
programming. Young people interview politicians and others for video “Hot-Seat”
interviews, make films about issues in their communities, and can identify (through a
postcode search) and email their elected representatives at local government (District
Council), Northern Ireland Assembly, Westminster and European Parliament levels about
issues that are important to them. The website also has an active discussion forum, where
young people discuss issues that are important and relevant to them.
A common criticism of civic education programmes is that too much emphasis is
placed on transferring civic “knowledge” and insufficient attention is paid to engaging young
people in the practice of democracy (Quaynor, 2012). However, Public Achievement takes
the position that young people are citizens now, rather than citizens in preparation (Smyth,
2012, p. 8). This, the director of Public Achievement argues, is in line with Miller’s (2000)
active model of citizenship. Distinct from the liberal model (under which citizenship is seen
as a set of rights and obligations) and the consumer model (whereby citizens are consumers
of services and rights are ‘handed down’); under the active model citizens are actively
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involved in the way their community functions. Under this model Miller (2000) envisages a
society,
In which ordinary people are heavily involved in deciding issues and achieving
goals, not just voting for governments and then letting them make decisions for
them. ..If we are going to rely on active citizenship to decide issues, then citizens
have to be prepared to see beyond their own interests and commitments and take a
wider, more impartial view. ..This identification...gives you a sense of
responsibility for the whole, and not merely the particular subgroup you belong to,
whether this is an ethnic group, or a group of like-minded activists. (p. 29)
Public Achievement’s evaluation indicates early evidence of impact both in terms of
increased civic knowledge of participants and also an increased readiness to approach
politicians and take action on what they consider to be important issues. Research, by Smyth
(2013), documents the way in which attitudes of young people towards politicians have
changed throughout the course of the project. In fact the young people expressed surprise at
the ease with which they could approach key figures, “The access that we could have with
politicians as young people, and how easy it was to go up to Stormont (the home of the
parliament in Northern Ireland)...in fact they wanted you to come up!” (p. 344). In particular,
Smyth’s research demonstrates that the media training and the quality of the equipment plays
a key role in giving participants the confidence needed to approach and, at times, challenge
politicians. This highlights the importance of the skills training element of the project.
Moreover, Smyth’s (2013) research indicates a level of impact beyond the scope of the
project, with some evidence of participants going on to become involved in school and
student politics (pp. 344-345).
The active citizenship model is not only important in encouraging greater forms of
youth participation, but also has particular benefits given the problematic nature of national
identity in post-accord Northern Ireland. The baseline data indicates that WIMPS
participants have diverse backgrounds. Ages of participants range from 12 to 30 years old,
with the mean age of participants being 17.3 years. Both female and males participate in
WIMPS, although there is a larger proportion of females (70%) than males (30%). Most
notably, however, there is an almost equal distribution of participants from the Protestant
(52%) and Catholic (48%) communities. Smyth (2012) argues that it is the active citizenship
model that allows the creation of a neutral space (both virtual and face-to-face) where
members of the different traditions can come to work together on common goals.
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The young people are aware of the citizens paradox- that it is difficult to agree on
notions of citizenship when we can’t agree what we are citizens of- but their
practical sense of active citizenship means that notions of national identity take a
back seat. (p. 348)
More research is needed into the implications of this approach for long term social
cohesion and democratic values. However, it is clear that one important impact of the
programme is that it has allowed young people to meet and work with individuals from other
communities and gain greater awareness of the multiples sides to understanding truth.
Conclusion
This analysis has highlighted important linkages between education and conflict with
implications for peacebuilding programming. The literature, however, has largely neglected
the role of non-formal youth programming, despite its importance in contexts of conflict.
This paper has provided an analysis of three youth programmes that have contributed to
social, economic and political transformations in post-accord Northern Ireland. One
important distinction to emerge relates to the inclusion of multiple youth perspectives and
backgrounds in each of these programmes. Fifteen years after the peace agreement people in
Northern Ireland “still live, work and learn in a largely segregated society” (International
Fund for Ireland, 2010, p. 3). There are currently 59 peace walls dividing communities
across Northern Ireland, nine of which have been erected since the signing of the peace
agreement in 1998, and data from the 2011 census shows that 37% of electoral wards are
single identity (as defined by having 80% or more from one communal background). In
particular, the education sector is an important mechanism in the reproduction of this
structural segregation. The establishment of 62 integrated “common” schools serving 7% of
the school population is a considerable achievement in the midst of conflict and within a
divided society (Smith, 2013). However, recent figures show that almost half of Northern
Ireland’s school children are still being taught in schools where 95% or more of the pupils are
of the same religion (Hansson et al., 2013, p. 47).
Given the context of segregation and the current limitations of the formal education
sector as a mechanism for transformation, the inclusion of multiples youth perspectives in
non-formal youth programmes is an important contribution. A common criticism of
intercultural programmes is that they tend to attract young people who already hold positive
attitudes towards intergroup mixing and who have parents who also support intergroup
mixing. From a peacebuilding perspective this raises a critical question regarding the politics
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of which youth voices are represented. Youth are not a homogeneous group that exist in
isolation from conflict itself. Youth may be perpetrators as well as victims of violence,
mobilized to fuel the conflict as well as motivated to end it. This presents significant
challenges for genuine youth engagement in terms of identifying the multiplicity of youth
perspectives on the conflict, the politics of who represents youth opinion, and which youth
organizations receive funding and resources. Perhaps the greatest challenge is that
peacebuilding inevitably involves bringing politically opposed or marginalized groups into
dialogue. While peace agreements might represent new working arrangements between
political elites, relapses into conflict are common, especially where younger generations do
not see or experience the benefits of peace. Sustainable peace is therefore unlikely without
youth commitment, since it is the youth who have the capacity to carry a conflict into the next
generation. This means that difficult and sometimes unpopular decisions have to be made
about how to achieve youth engagement that is inclusive of the full range of youth. From a
peacebuilding perspective, consideration of inclusion needs to go beyond measures of
equality in terms of representation from the two communities, to examine the politics of
which youth voices are being represented.
Furthermore, whilst the three case study youth programmes have clearly identified
theories of change, it is questionable to what extent these have been designed and articulated
from a peacebuilding perspective. The Children’s Friendship Project for Northern Ireland
(CFPNI) has a strong basis in contact hypothesis theory and follows the key steps outlined by
researchers. However, the reluctance to discuss divisive issues leads us to question its
transformative potential. In terms of economic contribution to transformation, technical and
vocational training schemes often receive criticism in the international literature for failing to
increase employment opportunities. It is argued that this may even lead to the creation of
grievances in the mismatch between aspirations and reality. Wider Horizons has
demonstrated a level of success in this regard, with a relatively high level of graduates
progressing into employment. However, it will be important to give consideration to the
implications of the current economic downturn for the programme from a conflict and
peacebuilding perspective. Finally, Public Achievement’s WIMPS project has perhaps the
most explicitly defined peacebuilding goal. New media allow participants to communicate
on an equal basis and raise issues that are of relevance to their lives. By putting youth in
direct contact with politicians, they can also act as an important mechanism of accountability
in support of political transformation.
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In conclusion, this article has highlighted three examples of programming that
contribute to social, economic and political transformations. Over the course of the past
fifteen years there has been an important shift in the priorities and objectives of actors and
agencies involved in youth programming in Northern Ireland. From an early emphasis on
economic regeneration, realisation of the persistent nature of segregation has led to an
emerging consensus around the need for peacebuilding. This is a significant shift, with
important implications for programming. Crucially, it involves a shift towards a more
political realm. WIMPS is an explicitly political project, which perhaps explains why it is the
project that seems most at ease with the peacebuilding goal. However, all actors and
agencies need to give further thought as to what this shift means in practice for their priorities
and programming. From a peacebuilding perspective, key issues include the politics of
multiple youth representation as well as the design of youth programmes that are most likely
to bring about social, economic and political transformation.
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Moving ‘Beyond Neutrality’ and Cross-cultural Training:
Using World Café Dialogue to Address End-of-life Care Inequalities
Jacqueline N. Font-Guzmán*
Abstract
In this article I discuss how World Café Dialogues can be used to unveil structural and
cultural violence that drive the behaviors that maintain end-of-life care inequalities,
especially among minorities, in acute healthcare hospitals. Conflict practitioners are rarely
included in conversations of end-of-life care inequalities and when included it is to “solve a
problem” through bioethics mediation or provide training in cross-cultural competence. I
argue that conflict practitioners need to broaden their approach to conflict and use their skills
to surface unequal power structures and implicit beliefs that maintain the unjust status quo in
end-of-life care disparities.

Introduction
“You ache with the need to convince yourself that you do exist in the real world,
that you’re part of all sound and anguish, and you strike out with your fists,
you curse and you swear to make them recognize you. And, alas, it’s seldom successful!”
(Ellison, 1995, p. 4)
In May 2006, I co-facilitated with two colleagues (Debra Gerardi and Rob Robson) a
World Café Dialogue in San Francisco, USA (hereinafter, Patient Safety World Café). We
welcomed approximately fifty people from North, Central, and South America to share their
experiences, wisdom, and knowledge on how to improve patient safety and raise awareness
about the devastating impact of medical errors. The participants of the Patient Safety World
Café fell in one of the following categories: victims of a medical error as a patient or family
member, clinicians who had partaken in a chain of events that led to a medical error, and/or
patient advocates. The result of many of the medical errors discussed in the Patient Safety
World Café had resulted in someone’s death. This event was sponsored by the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO).
* I thank my colleagues Dr. Bernie Mayer and Noam Ebner, The Werner Institute, Creighton University School of Law, for their constructive feedback and Dr. John
Stone, Center for Health Policy and Ethics, Creighton University, for our many conversations about health disparities and for sharing valuable references with me on the
topic. I am also indebted to my colleague and friend Debra Gerardi, Emerging HealthCare Communities, for inviting me to co-facilitate the World Café Dialogue that I am
discussing in this article. I am also thankful to Ajla Aljic, joint degree student at Creighton University Werner Institute and School of Law, for her assistance with citations
and references.
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The Patient Safety World Café participants were welcomed into a room with
background music, snacks, round tables, and tablecloths. At the tables there were colored
markers, different color post-it notes, and flip chart paper for participants to write notes
summarizing the main points in the discussion and/or doodle. There were three rounds of
conversations driven by questions, previously drafted, and every twenty minutes or so, music
alerted the participants that it was time to relocate to another table with a newly formed group
and share their ideas. The three questions that served as discussion starters in each successive
round were: What is important to our group? What does the group need in order to be
energized and feel engaged in these efforts? What conversations could create ripples and
create new possibilities for engagement? After finalizing all three rounds, the facilitators led a
group discussion to share as a group the patterns and themes that had emerged. Contrary to
brainstorming, where the main goal is usually to generate solutions or strategies to solve a
problem, through these questions our aim was to foster deep listening, enable a diverse group
of people to connect with each other, and tap into their inner wisdom. A graphic artist
captured the narratives that emerged in the conversations.
Within minutes, strangers were actively engaged in powerful conversations. They
were sharing their intimate experiences, frustrations, fears, hopes, values, expectations, and
feelings about death, dying, and living. These conversations not only served as a
communication tool, they were creating experiences. You could feel the intensity of the
synergy in the room. As I will further discuss in this article, the taboo topics of dying,
medical errors, and the structural and cultural violence that surrounds dying patients, were
unveiled. Contrary to ethics consultation which focuses on the care of an individual patient,
these conversations addressed broader systemic challenges.
This article is an invitation to conflict practitioners to use dialogue processes,
specifically World Café, to unveil unequal power structures during end-of-life care that allow
for disparate treatment of minorities and to confront oppressive structures that prevent their
end-of-life needs and wishes to be honored. This invitation is consistent with Mayer’s (2004)
call to have engagement professionals question normative assumptions of the field in order to
deal more effectively with diversity and challenge hierarchical structures that favor the
dominant culture. I argue that through dialogue processes, conflict practitioners can pose a
challenge to oppressive power structures by educating those with power about the mutual
benefit of altering relationships so that they can lead using “power with” and not “power
over.” Conflict practitioners need to expand their role in healthcare beyond the scope of
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mediation, negotiation, and cross-cultural training (hereinafter, CCT) as a way to engage with
end-of-life conflict.
I have chosen end-of-life care because it is a stage in which cultural beliefs, from
patients and providers, are more palpable and prone to clash (Krakauer, Crenner & Fox,
2002). In addition, throughout the dying process, structural and cultural violence become
ubiquitous. Moreover, death is a universal phenomenon and how we die is intrinsically
related to how we live. I also focus the discussion on clinician/physician’s role in end-of-life
care to narrow the scope of this article. I begin by discussing end-of-life care disparities. I
then discuss structural and cultural violence in end-of-life care and how it is institutionalized
in ways that sustain end-of-life care disparity. I conclude by showing how CCT training has
been ineffective in addressing disparate end-of-life care and that conflict engagement
practitioners have the necessary skills to facilitate structural interventions in acute healthcare
facilities that may rearrange power structures and lessen unequal end-of-life care.
Health Disparities and the Dying Patient
The manner in which dying patients continue to be invisible in many acute healthcare
settings in the United States and are victims of healthcare inequalities is unconscionable. The
dying patients in acute healthcare settings are either “minimized” or “swept beyond view into
palliative care” because they do not fall within the norm of saving lives (Chapple, 2010, p.
27). Palliative care aims at alleviating pain and relieving symptoms. Since many
physicians/clinicians see palliative care as inconsistent with saving lives, they have the
misconception that this type of care should only take place once all rescuing attempts have
been exhausted (Chapple, 2010). As I will illustrate in this article, worse than being a dying
patient, is being a dying patient who is perceived by medical personnel as belonging to a
“different” culture, race, or ethnicity. Evidence points to the fact that minority patients are not
benefiting from the efforts that have been undertaken to improve end-of life care (Krakauer,
et al., 2002). These “different” dying patients become unintelligible. In Butler’s (2004)
words, you are unintelligible
when the laws of culture and of language find you to be an impossibility [you have
no] access to the human, [you] find that your language is hollow, that no
recognition is forthcoming because the norms by which recognition takes place are
not in your favor. (p.30)
There is bountiful empirical evidence that African Americans and other racial and
ethnic minorities receive lower quality of healthcare than whites, even when taking into
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account factors such as insurance status, age, income, and illness severity (Institute of
Medicine of the National Academies (IOMNA), 2002; American Medical Association, 2009).
This unequal treatment is also present in end-of-life care (Welch, Teno, & Mor, 2005). Many
dying patients are subjected to unnecessary pain as a result of caregivers’ lack of knowledge
of available pharmacological interventions and ignorance as to other available palliative care
(Institute of Medicine (IOM), 1997; Krakauer et al., 2002). Furthermore, cultural biases and
fears about death are a contributing factor in healthcare professionals avoiding dying patients
and their families (IOM, 1997). Additionally, minority patients’ responses to physicians’
biases and their own biases may result in higher levels of mistrust towards clinicians and
healthcare institutions when compared with white patients (Dovidio & Fiske, 2012).
In an attempt to improve the communication skills of physicians with dying patients
across cultures and reducing health care inequalities, cultural competence programs have
flourished throughout the United States. Medical schools and residency programs in the
United States are required to include in their curriculum CCT and education in end-of-life
care (Chun, Yamada, Huh, Hew, & Tasaka, 2010; Sulmasy, Cimino, He, & Frishman, 2008;
Graves, Like, Kelly, & Hohensee, 2007). Although research indicates that CCT has the
potential for improving cross-cultural communication between physicians and patients,
evidence linking minority healthcare disparities with lack of cultural competence is, at the
most, meager (Stone, 2008; Yamada & Breckke, 2008).
Herein I argue that dying patients, in particular minorities, in acute care facilities are
victims of larger social forces (e.g., poverty, racism, and discrimination) who are either
ignored or marginalized during their last days. I maintain that in order to address healthcare
inequalities in end-of-life care, it is imperative to address the power structures that allow for
health disparities to take place (Farmer, 2010; Farmer, Nizeye, Stulac, & Keshavjee, 2006).
Blaming physicians’ lack of cultural competence for health disparities is at best, a cop-out
strategy. Playing the blaming game provides a false sense of action and ignores the root
causes of unequal distributions of power within the health care system. In many healthcare
CCTs, culture has been reduced to a utilitarian variable, “a kind of quasi-analytical category
used to explain variation in behavior” (Stephenson, 2001, p. 4). Minorities continue to suffer
painful deaths in acute hospitals and their end-of-life care preferences are ignored because
they are dying, immigrants, poor, non-white, and victims of racism; it is not because
physicians lack cultural competency.
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Structural Violence and Cultural Violence in End-of-Life Care
Minority patients dying in acute care facilities are rendered invisible and at best, are a
marginalized group within the healthcare system who are victims of structural violence.
Structural violence is a process by which social or institutional structures (e.g., legal,
religious, political, economical) perpetuate unequal power distributions that prevent certain
groups from fulfilling basic needs such as survival, wellbeing, identity, and freedom
(Galtung, 1990). This type of violence is structural because it is ingrained in the political and
economic systems that form our social world; violent because it is preventable and it injures
members of the society, usually those that are more distressed or destitute (Farmer et al.,
2006). The “underdogs” can be so disadvantaged in this relationship that they can die or be in
a “permanent state of misery” (Galtung, 1990, p 293).
In the healthcare and legal systems, insurance companies, hospitals, and schools of
medicine there are plentiful evidence of structural violence that are sources of healthcare
disparities for minorities and interfere with providing adequate care to the dying patient
(IOM, 1997; IOMNA, 2002). Examples include economic barriers due to inadequate
healthcare insurance, social barriers that prevent equal access to care in comparison to whites,
and underrepresentation of minority clinicians in medicine (Krakauer et al., 2002). These
barriers have a direct impact on patients’ wellbeing and survival (Moseley & Kershaw,
2012). Several studies have shown that some physicians perceive black patients as less
intelligent, less cooperative, less likely to comply with treatment plans, and more likely to
engage in destructive behavior such as drug abuse when compared to white patients (Ryn &
Burke, 2000; Sabin, Nosek, Greenwald, & Rivara, 2009; Weng & Korte, 2012). Physicians
that hold these beliefs may be less likely to recommend certain treatments to blacks because
they see it as “wasteful” (IOM, 1997, p. 173). These racial biases that lead to discrimination
are often present at a subconscious level and are more prevalent when communicating with
patients and families that are perceived to be from a different culture or race (Surbone, 2010,
citing Sabin et al., 2009).
Many of these disparities are traced to historic patterns of segregation and
discrimination that were legalized in the past and unfortunately continue to have a negative
impact today (IOMNA, 2002). Segregation, oppression, and violence against blacks were
institutionalized as a result, in part, of the American elite and the judicial system defining
who is black by the one-drop rule (Davis, 2002). Anyone who had a “single drop of black
blood” was considered black by definition and consequently inferior (Davis, 2002, p. 5). This
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social construct was institutionalized with the help of legislation and judicial decisions such
as Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537. This judicial decision endorsed segregation by
taking judicial notice, “that a negro or black is any person with any black ancestry” and it was
acceptable to be separate but equal (Davis, 2002, p. 8).
One of the many impacts of segregation in the United States is that there is a legacy of
underrepresentation of minority healthcare providers (Welch et al., 2005; Merchant &
Omary, 2010). Decisions such as Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) 163 US 537 and Jim Crow laws
(U.S. laws that allowed for racial segregation prior to 1965) accentuated racial divides which
resulted in the exclusion of minority physicians from medical education which historically
has been largely limited to white, male, and upper class individuals (IOMNA, 2002).
Throughout the 20th century, only 12% of North American physicians come from a working
class background (Wear, 2003, p. 553). The mean income of the parents of medical students
who enrolled in all the Association of American Medical Colleges for year 2000 was
$101,319 and the mean education level for fathers was a graduate degree and for mothers a
college degree (Wear, 2003, p. 553, citing Association of American Medical Colleges, 2000).
This tendency of medical students to come from a family in which both parents are highly
educated and have a high socioeconomic background continued between 1992 and 2008 and
is most noticeable among white students (Grbic, Garrison, & Jolly, 2010). In 2011 the
percentage of minority students matriculated in medical schools (e.g., Asian (20.1%),
Hispanic (8.5%), black (6.1%), and Native American, Alaskan, Hawaiian, and other Pacific
Islander (0.1%)) continues to be extremely low when compared to white students (57.5%)
(Association of American Medical Colleges, 2012, p.27).
Beyond the legal and medical ideology, the scientific community has also been
instrumental in legitimizing and perpetuating discrimination towards minority groups by
promoting theories such as eugenics that were used to wrongly justify the inferiority of
minority groups (e.g., African Americans, poor, mentally retarded) (IOMNA, 2002). To this
day, many blacks distrust medical institutions and white physicians as a result of a collective
memory of oppression that springs from abuses such as the Tuskegee experiments by which
black patients were untreated for syphilis decades after there was a cure in order to see the
effects of the disease (Bloche, 2001; Welch et al., 2005).
Structural violence, in turn, is justified or legitimized by cultural violence to the
extent that it becomes ubiquitous and yet, simultaneously, invisible (Farmer et al., 2006;
Galtung, 1990). Cultural violence “makes direct and structural violence look, even feel right,
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or at least not wrong” (Galtung, 1990, p. 291). Cultural violence is a mental process that
operates by changing the moral value of an act from wrong to right or acceptable (Galtung,
1990). For example, black and other minority patients are usually administered less pain
medication when compared to white patients (Krakauer et al., 2002; Pletcher, Kertesz, Kohn,
& Gonzales, 2008). The question has been posed as to whether there is an unconscious belief
that blacks have less sensitivity to pain, which was one of the many alleged features that
justified the medical community to perform unconscionable experiments on them (Krakauer
et al., 2002). This would make it “right” or “acceptable” to withhold pain medication.
Another way in which cultural violence operates is by blurring reality so that a violent and/or
unjust act becomes invisible or not so violent (Galtung, 1990). For example, providing futile
healthcare or unwanted extraordinary measures to a patient that is dying has become an
invisible violent act; alternatively, it is not seen as overly violent. Biotechnology has turned
into an ideology and physicians feel compelled to exercise power over the patient and sustain
life, in spite of the patient’s wish (Brodwin, 2000). Technology becomes a social imperative
and is seen as necessary and not as a contingency; “what is contingent […] is regarded as
natural” (Brodwin, 2000, p. 214).
Cultural violence also takes place through language. Medical students learn how to
communicate in very formalized, unambiguous, and precise terms with the purpose of
selecting from the patient’s narrative “only the ‘important negatives’ that might cast doubt on
a diagnosis, and not to mention a positive symptom or finding without following its
implications further” (Sinclair, 1997, p. 213). In end-of-life conversations, the focus
continues to be on specific interventions rather than long term implications (e.g., “Do you
want an insulin drip?”) (Lamas & Rosenbaum, 2012, p. 1656). Although some medical
schools are beginning to address this issue, medical students continue to focus on the problem
at hand and thinking in terms of “what ifs?” is not encouraged (Dokken & Ahmann, 2006,
p.175). The focus is on the present. For example, oncologists “deliberately ‘blur the horizon
of the future’ and create for patients an experience of immediacy or living for the moment”
(Johnson, Cook, Giacomini, & Willms, 2000, p. 281; Lamas & Rosenbaum, 2012). The
mother of a premature baby who died in a pediatric intensive care unit describes the impact of
the doctor’s discourse on her in the following way: For the most part in the critical care
setting,
thinking tends to be short-term. We were never, and I say truly never, given
enough information or enough of an opening to discuss a long term view of
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Abby’s situation. No clinician had the courage to give us a “what ifs?”[…] the
approach impedes the notion of thinking about the longer-term consequences in
any aspects of planning ‘whether planning is going home or planning is starting
to confront that your child might die. (Dokken & Ahmann. 2006, p. 175)
Acquiring scientific language, “although unsuited to dealing with internal mental
events,” (Sinclair, 1997, p. 321) is seen as a necessary evil that allows physicians to be
objective and emotionally detached so that they can make proper clinical judgments
(Robichaud, 2003; Sinclair, 1997). Patients that are categorized as “incurable” are not worth
taking care of (Becker, Geer, Hughes, & Strauss, 1977, pp. 316-317; Chapple, 2010).
Physicians learn to limit their conversations with patients and families to “technical matters”
(Anspach & Beeson, 2001, p.122; Lamus & Rosenbaum, 2012). Recent studies have shown
that in spite of incorporating end-of-life care into the medical school “formal curriculum,” the
“hidden curriculum” (including the trainee’s observations and what they are taught in their
medical rounds) is to be emotionally detached and depersonalize the patient during their endof-life care (Billings, Engelberg, Curtis, Block, & Sullivan, 2010).
Structural and cultural violence are enabled and sustained by erasing and distorting
the historical memory thereby allowing hegemonic accounts of “what happened and why”
(Farmer, 2010, pp. 354-357). Therefore, it is not possible to have an honest dialogue about
drug addiction among blacks without having a conversation about slavery, segregation, and
discrimination in the United States (Farmer et al., 2006). As I will discuss later on, World
Café is an appropriate process to facilitate authentic conversations about end-of-life that
stimulate new ways of thinking and explore possibilities without ignoring the broader historic
and current context in which healthcare disparities take place.
Cross-cultural Competency Training (CCT)
Culture has been extensively discussed in the academic literature across different
disciplines and an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article. However, since
cultural differences are constantly (mis)used as “causes” of health disparity, I will provide a
brief contextual discussion. When it comes to culture most scholars in the health care and
conflict studies disciplines would agree that it is a set of behaviors, values, and customs that
are common to a group of people and that they use to make meaning of the world they live in
(e.g., Gregg & Saha, 2006; Mayer, 2012). Culture is about sense making. In his seminal
work, Geertz (1973) describes culture as “webs of significance” that man has spun himself
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“and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an
interpretive one in search of meaning” (p.5).
In the context of end-of-life care, culture shapes the manner in which patients,
doctors, family members and those who participate in the decision-making process make
sense of and experience death, life, and illness. Herein, I am adopting Kleinman’s (1988)
definition of illness as opposed to disease: illness is how the sick person and those who
comprise their social network experience and make sense of their symptoms; disease is the
situation as seen through the lens of the physician and the biomedical model (e.g.,
hypertension, panic attack).
In healthcare, cultural competence is defined as “the ability of health care
professionals to communicate with and effectively provide high-quality care to patients from
diverse sociocultural backgrounds; aspects of diversity include, but go beyond, race,
ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and country of origin” (Betancourt & Green, 2010, p.
583). After examining the definition of culture, it is perplexing that CCT has focused on
categories, such as race and ethnicity, to increase cultural competence and reduce health care
inequalities. It raises the question, if culture is about making sense and finding meaning, why
is the focus of CCT on boilerplate categories? How do these trainings reduce healthcare
inequalities for the dying patient?
Since the late 1970s many universities began to offer as part of their medical
education CCT to teach students about the health beliefs and practices of ethnic populations;
examples include the University of California at Davis and the Harvard Medical School
(Good, James, Good, & Becker, 2002). However, these trainings rarely focus on the
socialization of physicians or how it may contribute to the institutionalization of racism in the
practice of medicine (Good et al., 2002). Cross-cultural competency trainings in medicine
usually focus on attitudes, knowledge, and skills (IOMNA, 2002). The main focus in attitude
training is to increase provider awareness on how patient’s social and cultural background
impacts health care decisions (IOMNA, 2002). This approach encourages self-reflection,
which includes understanding one’s culture and biases (IOMNA, 2002). However, these
trainings usually are not effective in addressing the implicit biases that physicians hold. For
example, a recent study found that physicians show implicit (i.e., non-conscious beliefs not
apparent to the individual) reference for white Americans when compared to black
Americans (Sabin et al., 2009). The second approach, usually referred to as an etic approach,
is to focus on teaching providers the attitudes and beliefs of certain cultural groups (e.g.,
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“patients of culture x believe...and behave…”) (IOMNA, 2002, p. 206). The third approach is
to focus on developing tools and skills that improve the providers’ communication skills and
to apply an inductive framework that “focuses on the patient, rather than theory, as the
starting point for discovery” (IOMNA, 2002, p. 206-207).
The increased interest in trying to improve physicians’ cultural competency has
certainly raised awareness of the need to be culturally sensitive. However, there is still much
room for improvement. For example, although I do not deny the potential heuristic value of
taking an etic approach to CCT, one that privileges the outsider’s point of view and focuses
on isolating specific component of cultural groups, it tends to oversimplify the human
cultural matrix and encourage stereotypes (Morris, Leung, Ames, & Lickel, 1999). The focus
on attempting to configure universal categories of cultural behavior has unintentionally
ignored the synergistic interaction that takes place among different cultures and the fact that
cultures are dynamic.
A recent literature review reflects that most studies measure cultural influence
through racial or ethnic group membership that is “at best, a proxy for culture” (Kwack &
Haley, 2005, p. 640). Furthermore, there is an inherent challenge in trying to reduce
healthcare disparities by minimizing discrimination on the basis of race and ethnicity. That is,
“in order to minimize discrimination on the basis of difference between people, differences
must be systematically and authoritatively monitored, recorded and hence re-emphasized”
(Banks, 1999, pp. 74-75). By subsuming race under culture, racism is redefined as a “cultural
difference” which makes it easier to ignore racism, privilege, and power relations such as
dominance/subordination (Beagan, 2003; Gregg & Saha, 2006). Framing CCT as learning
how the “other” non-dominant group behaves and what their beliefs are has tendencies that
may lead the learner to see them as inferior, exotic, or aberrant (Wear, 2003). This
erroneously assumes that “normal” is an objective and color blind standard that does not
reflect the cultural values of the dominant medical culture.
Taking an etic approach to culture allows for the hard questions to remain
unanswered: What are the structural and systemic changes that need to take place so that
dying patients are no longer oppressed and ignored? How does occupying a space of white
privilege impact end-of-life care for minorities? How do we address in CCTs the unequal
power relationships and structural forces that have been sustaining health care inequality in
the United States for centuries?
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Even more worrisome is the fact that most of the approaches to teach cultural
competency ignore the relationship between cultural differences and inequities; by focusing
on individual attitudes they ignore the source of inequality by keeping the “focus off
structures, institutions, and governmental policies” (Wear, 2003, p. 551). In short, power
differentials are ignored. As Kritek (2002) has pointed out “if you take the time to evaluate an
uneven table, you can usually find what is missing—what dimensions of the conflict are
being treated as if they simply did not exist” (p. 274). I posit that dialogue processes, such as
World Café, are better equipped to unveil these unequal power structures. These invisible
power structures become visible in World Cafés through deep listening and conversations
about dying that take place among a diverse group of people (diversity in professional
backgrounds and cultures). Once participants’ “blindfolds” are lifted they can name the
injustices and address them. The structural inequities that lead to unequal treatment are so
complex that they must be addressed through “deliberative and collaborative actions” from
diverse sectors (Beadle, 2011, p. S17). The World Café is an excellent process for these
deliberative and collaborative actions to take place.
Beyond Bioethics Mediation: World Café
When it comes to end-of-life conflict, conflict practitioners have limited their
interventions, for the most part, to bioethics mediation. Bioethics mediation addresses
conflicts that arise in a clinical healthcare context regarding the “proper” or “appropriate”
plan regarding future goals of care (Bergman, 2013; Dubler, 2011). The main exponents and
pioneers of bioethics mediation are Nancy N. Dubler and Carol B. Liebman (2004, 2011).
Their model, which started in the 1990’s at Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx, is based
on a problem-solving mediation style and is framed within a principle-based approach or
principlism.
A principled-based-approach to mediation visualizes principles as the essence of
moral reasoning and has been the dominant discourse in Western bioethics for the last forty
years (Beauchamp & Childress, 2001; McCarthy, 2003). In the context of bioethics
mediation, “a principled resolution is a consensus that identifies a plan that falls within
clearly accepted ethical principles, legal stipulations, and moral rules defined by ethical
discourse, legislatures, and courts, and that facilitates a clear plan for future intervention”
(Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p, 14). Within the bioethics mediation model as applied by Dubler
and Liebman (2004) the four ethical principles are patient autonomy, beneficence,
nonmaleficence, and distributive justice. Patient autonomy is the center of the decision
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making process and what this means is that priority should be given the patient’s values and
wishes, and their choices must be supported (Dubler & Liebman, 2004). The principle of
beneficence “underlies obligations to provide the best care for the patient and balance the
risks or burdens of care against the benefits” (Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p. 37). Nonmaleficence requires that the benefits of treatment outweigh the possible harm and the patient
should not be harmed (Dubler & Liebman, 2004). Finally, distributive justice is defined as
providing to each individual what is due or owed, “what is fair” (Dubler & Liebman, 2004, p.
37).
The role of a bioethics mediator is to remain neutral while equally empowering all of
the participants to engage in problem-solving within the limits of the accepted dominant
medical norm, as delineated by the four ethical principles listed above. Neutrality, in the
context of bioethics mediation, is usually defined as not having a stake in the outcome and
not favoring any side (Gibson, 1999; Marcus, Dorn, & McNulty, 2011), and not taking a
stand as to the legitimacy of a moral position (Fiester, 2012). The mediator remains neutral as
to the participants’ final agreement, but is not neutral when it comes to how the process is
managed; the mediator is an advocate of the process not the participants (Dubler & Liebman,
2011; Fiester, 2012).
I am not implying that bioethics mediators using a problem-solving methodology and
principled-based approach are ignoring the end-of-life goals of minority patients and their
cultural values by privileging the dominant medical culture. Dubler (2005) has argued, and I
agree, that while bioethical analysis usually privileges the “dominant medical culture,” the
mediation process may deal better with addressing cultural differences than non-facilitated
discussions (p. S24). The mediation setting provides a space in which the voices of
disempowered groups can be amplified and diverse cultural values are honored (Dubler &
Liebman, 2011). Nevertheless, there are serious limitations in the bioethics mediation model
in terms of addressing structural and cultural violence. For example, during a bioethics
mediation session, if agreement is not reached, the dominant medical, legal, and ethical
culture will be imposed (Dubler & Liebman, 2011).
I submit that conflict practitioners should take a more active role in addressing
healthcare inequalities within healthcare institutions through other processes such as World
Café conversations. In other words, what would happen if conflict practitioners move beyond
their traditional “neutral” and problem-solving approaches? What if conflict practitioners
were willing to use dialogue processes to raise awareness regarding unequal power structures
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that negatively impacts end-of-life care within acute hospitals? “The problem-solving mindset can be adequate for technical problems. But it can be woefully inadequate for complex
human systems where problems often arise from unquestioned assumptions and deeply
habitual ways of acting” (Senge, Scharmer, Jaworski, & Flowers, 2005, pp. 51-52). Structural
and cultural violence persist when erroneous assumptions remain unquestioned and become
accepted ways of acting. Therefore, taking a problem-solving approach to surface and
identify structural and cultural violence is ineffective in altering an unjust status quo.
Conflict practitioners can provide an important service by unveiling power structures
that are an obstacle for patients to have their end-of-life wishes honored. This can happen
through dialogue processes that raise awareness about the importance of discussing end-oflife goals of care, explore the social forces that operate in healthcare institutions that are
oppressive to dying patients, and empower clinicians and patients to alter unequal social
structures. Awareness of these social forces and the skills to change the power structures are
very rarely taught to clinicians (Farmer, et al., 2006). However, there is some evidence that it
is possible to address structural violence in healthcare, by way of structural interventions
without the need of tackling more complex issues such as eliminating racism or a lack of
national insurance (Farmer, et al., 2006). For example, a group of researchers and clinicians
in Baltimore were able to reduce significantly the racial, gender, and socioeconomic
disparities in HIV treatment within the group being studied by posing the following question:
“what would happen if race and insurance status no longer determined who had access to
standard of care?” (Farmer et al., 2006, p.1688). Exploring the answer to this question
allowed clinicians to address issues of structural violence by first being able to “see” these
injustices as they surface throughout the conversation and subsequently removing obvious
economic barriers such as transportation costs, providing community-based care that allowed
for better access, and educating the community to decrease stigma against patients with AIDS
(Farmer et al., 2006).
The World Café is a conversational process that surfaces deeper assumptions and
network patterns through which people can have intimate exchanges, discover shared
meaning, engage in disciplined inquiries, cross-pollinate ideas, and think about what is
possible (Brown & Isaacs, 2005; Brown, Homer, & Isaacs, 2007). The emphasis is on
collective understanding and not problem-solving. In a World Café several small round tables
that sit four to five participants are placed in a welcoming space and in each table they
explore questions that matter to them (Brown et al., 2007). Questions are discussed in
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iterative rounds of conversations, usually no more than three, with each round lasting
between twenty to thirty minutes (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). After the first round of
conversation, participants are invited to move to another table and share their ideas with the
newly-formed group (Brown et al., 2007). Usually one participant stays at the table and
serves as a “host” to the new group and shares with the new participants the highlights of the
earlier conversation (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). After several rounds of conversations the whole
group engages in mutual reflection and a conversation to identify patterns, discuss what they
have discovered, and share ideas that are meaningful to them (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). The
collective knowledge is made visible by writing or drawing the ideas that surfaced throughout
the process (Brown & Isaacs, 2005). These ideas, as explained later on, may lead to action.
The World Café approach entails a dialogue process which is built on the assumption
that people already possess the wisdom and creativity to engage challenges and also, the
following seven core principles: 1) clarify purpose and parameters; 2) focus on questions that
encourage collaborative participation; 3) encourage full participation; 4) cross-pollinate and
connect diverse perspectives; 5) listen together for patterns, insights and deeper questions; 6)
share collective knowledge; and 7) create a hospitable space (Tan & Brown, 2005).
World Café is a deceptively simple process (Prewitt, 2011). Its simplicity and lack of
emphasis on problem-solving is what makes it such a powerful process in surfacing implicit
beliefs and social forces such as those that perpetuate unequal treatment during end-of-life
care. World Café theory and practice is partly informed by Bohm’s (1996) approach to
dialogue (as cited in Prewitt, 2011). Bohm (1996) posits that in order to think in new ways,
society’s tacit infrastructure (e.g., assumptions, attitudes and beliefs that are rigidly and
unconsciously held) need to be unearthed and understood through a dialogic process that
requires the suspension of assumptions and values (as cited in Nichol, 2003). Bringing these
assumptions to light and reflecting upon them could reveal “blind spots” that allow
participants of the dialogue process to achieve greater collective understanding and learning
(Prewitt, 2011, p. 191, as cited in Atlee, 2009; Hansen, 2008). When participants act based on
this collective understanding and learning one can see the tangible results of the World Café
conversations (Brown, 2001).
Participants of the initial small group conversations share their new ideas with other
groups and this creates the possibility of large-scale institutional and societal change (Brown,
2001; Brown et al., 2007). For example, World Café dialogue may raise awareness of how
the system operates and raise consciousness about the need for institutional change. At the
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individual level patients and clinicians may modify their behavior if they “see” the
connection between their behavior and health inequalities; at the community level, awareness
may lead to groups organizing and pushing for changes in public policies that maintain
oppressive structures (Benz, Espinosa, Welsh, & Fontes, 2011). Participants in World Café
dialogues have described the process, not as “an activism against the authority structure but
for the world we want” (Tan & Brown, 2005, p. 89). World Café conversations serve as a
conduit to minimize the distance inherent in unequal power relationships and serves as a
bridge between the past and the future (Tan & Brown, 2005).
Stepping away from a neutral stance and hosting World Café conversations through a
critical theory framework could transform the taken-for-granted inequities that take place in
end-of-life care. Hansen (2008) makes a compelling argument as to how conflict practitioners
who wish to address social justice issues would benefit from incorporating into their practice
an analysis of power and how to assist clients in overcoming structural and cultural violence.
In the Patient Safety World Café, some of the unequal power relationships that participants
identified as being important to them were the following: justice, equity, and addressing
power imbalances; address political barriers such as corruption and fear of retaliation; the
need for meaningful dialogue between patients and healthcare professionals; and challenge
conventional authority in healthcare. By facilitating a discussion of these themes, participants
shared their collective wisdom as to how to address these social justice concerns, and more
importantly they began building networks and relationships.
Facilitating World Café conversations with physicians, healthcare clinicians, patients,
family of patients, policy makers, and administrators could be valuable in unveiling end-oflife structural and cultural violence to the extent that it allows participants to: 1) discover and
reframe unconscious biases; 2) share new meanings and knowledge through collective
discoveries; 3) build relationships and networks; 4) develop attitudes that stimulate
innovative thinking 5) engage in self-reflection; 6) cultivate collective intelligence; 7)
identify and analyze the causes and effects of unequal distributions of power in healthcare;
and 8) explore in-depth some of the key challenges and opportunities in end-of-life care.
Brown and Isaacs (2005) invite us to see conversation as action because, based on their
experiences with World Cafés, when participants are having conversations about issues that
they care about they want to organize and take further action. In the Patient Safety World
Café, one of the themes that emerged was, “transform pain and hurt into action.” Participants
in the Patient Safety World Café drafted a joint statement pledging to fight medical errors and
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developed strategies to advance their cause. Some of the strategies discussed were to identify
power figures and organizations to share their statement with, identify media connections,
create a listserv/clearing house, and connect with other organizations. Conversation, led to
action.
Conclusion
In spite of the many initiatives that have been initiated in the last decades directed at
eliminating end-of-life care inequalities; these disparities continue to be prevalent in
healthcare institutions in the United States. Conflict practitioners have not fully inserted
themselves, nor are they usually invited, to these conversations due, in part, to a narrow
approach to conflict that hinders the capacity to step out of a position of neutrality and use
their skills and processes to challenge the status quo and unequal power relationships. For the
most part, conflict practitioners are partaking in end-of-life conflict as a third party “neutral”
through bioethics mediation whose role is to remain impartial and try to assist people in
reaching a mutually agreeable solution to their problem or serving as trainers in CCTs. These
approaches have made some progress in raising awareness, improving clinicians’ attitudes
towards minorities, and increasing cultural competence. However, they have been less
successful in addressing cultural and structural violence, reducing healthcare disparities, or
improving healthcare outcomes (Betancourt & Greene, 2010; Rabinovich-Einy, 2011).
Nearly a decade ago, Mayer (2004) invited conflict professionals to challenge their
assumptions of neutrality and expand their role in helping people engage with conflict. Most
recently, Hansen (2008) has also argued in favor of conflict practitioners taking “atypical”
roles and serve as advocates, advisors, or any other role that allows marginalized individuals
to challenge oppressive structures through constructive dialogue. These “atypical” roles, are
more common among peacebuilding practitioners, but are less common among conflict
practitioners. Being a third party neutral is still seen by conflict practitioners as a core part of
their identity. Conflict practitioners continue to identify themselves by the role they have in a
conflict as opposed to focusing on the purpose of the intervention (Mayer, 2012). As I have
discussed in this article, hosting World Café conversations could be an excellent process for
unveiling unequal power structures in end-of-life care. If conflict practitioners “let go” of
their illusion of neutrality they could make significant contributions to reducing end-of-life
care inequalities.
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Abstract
Nearly one hundred years have passed since the Armenian genocide, which prefaced and
in some ways encouraged the Holocaust – yet the Turkish government continues to deny
the genocide and uses political manipulation to prevent its recognition by others. The
denial’s history has been one of collaborative repression, but in recent years Turkish
voices have joined with Armenians’ in the struggle for recognition; collaborative
struggle, particularly in recognition of shared history, may represent the best chance to
pressure Turkey to federally recognize the genocide. This paper explores the
machinations of the denial and its significance in the twenty-first century, as well as the
consequences of the Armenian genocide for its victims and their descendants. As a
global perspective drawn from Armenian diaspora studies demonstrates, the genocide
remains a significant part of a global consciousness of pan-Armenian identity. This
identity remains trapped as a victim of the genocide, just as the denial entraps Turkish
identity.

Introduction
“Denial of genocide strives to reshape history into order to demonize the victims and
rehabilitate the perpetrators, and is – indeed – the final stage of genocide” (Lipstadt in
Balakian, 2003, p. 383). If we take denial to be the final phase of genocide, this means the
Armenian genocide has continued for nearly a century, as this final phase has been inherited
and continued by successive generations of Turkish politicians, whose efforts have become
more aggressive in recent decades. In turn, members of Armenian communities, in Armenia
itself, where approximately 3 million Armenians live, and in the diaspora as well, the
scattered international communities of as many as 8 million Armenians, have worked to
counter Turkey’s efforts, lobbying governments and international organizations to officially
recognize the genocide. Despite some success, the Turkish denial continues, and continues to
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have significance not solely for Armenian communities, but also all of humanity. This is
particularly true because Turkish genocide denial sets a precedent and model, following in
step with the genocide itself, which set the precedent for the Holocaust of World War II.
This article reviews the history of the Turkish government’s denial of the Armenian
genocide, including the methods and goals of the denial, and the impacts of the genocide and
the denial on Armenians worldwide. Just as it argues that there has been a collaborative
repression of historical truth, involving academics and foreign state governments, among
others, it also argues that collaborative struggle between Armenian and Turkish activists, nongovernmental organizations, and communities offers the best opportunity to achieve Armenian
genocide recognition in Turkey based on recent events and the opportunity to continue
building on their momentum.
The Armenian Genocide and Its Aftermaths
At the end of the nineteenth century, the greatly diminished Ottoman Empire was in
the final stages of its decline. The Armenians, a Christian minority in the Muslim empire,
were living on the traditional homelands they had occupied for over 2000 years. In the 1800s,
the Ottoman Empire repeatedly went to war with Russia, a Christian empire, and lost much of
its territory, including Bulgaria, Bosnia, Herzegovina (Balakian, 2003, p. 145), and the
Balkans, largely Christian populations (p. 161). In response, the Ottoman government began
to frame Christians as its enemies (p. 145). Thus, those Christians within the Ottoman Empire
came under suspicion, in particular the Armenians (p. 198), as a large part of the Armenian
community lay within Russia’s borders. Armenians in what’s now eastern Turkey suffered
increasing attacks from Turkish mobs incited by official powers, the worst of these occurring
from 1894 – 1896 (p. 5), and again in 1909 (Balakian, 1997, p. 232; Gibbons, 1917).
At the start of World War I, the Ottoman Empire aligned itself with Germany, and
using the war as a guise, the Ottoman’s new government, the Young Turk Committee for
Union and Progress, enacted a policy of genocide against the empire’s Armenian population,
as well as Assyrian (Travis, 2006), Greek and other non-Muslim communities. The genocide
officially started on April 24, 1915, when Armenian intellectuals, community and religious
leaders in Istanbul were rounded up for interrogation, torture and execution (Balakian, 1997,
p. 235). Persecution of Armenians with intent of extermination continued across Anatolia,
what it today eastern Turkey, and then in the independent Republic of Armenia as Turkish
forces continually invaded (Balakian, 1997, p. 242; 2003, p. 328). Aida Alayarian (2008) sets
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the total number of Armenian deaths at over two million, including deaths from the pogroms
and massacres that began in 1894 and continued until 1922 (p. 9).
Two key events after the genocide have had profound and lasting impact on Armenia
and Armenians. One of these was the fate of the survivors. Their homelands became eastern
Turkey: village names were changed and Armenian churches and monuments destroyed;
even today, practically no Armenians live on this land (Hovannisian, R. K., 2003, p. 275).
Some survivors fled east to what is now the Republic of Armenia, then under the protection
of the Russian Empire and soon to be part of the Soviet Union. Others escaped and attempted
to assemble the remains of their families and villages in communities scattered across the
Middle East, Europe and North America. This formed the Armenian diaspora, which may
number approximately eight million today. The population of Armenia itself is only three
million (World Bank, n.d.). Studies of the diaspora have attested to a global, pan-Armenian
identity, though, as a result of its wide dispersion, it exists in a necessarily fragmented and
heterogeneous fashion (compare Bakalian, 1993; Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005; Kirkland,
1980a, 1980b; Schwalgin, 2004; Ziemer, 2009, 2010a, 2010b). Although few studies
document the Armenian diaspora (Kaprielian-Churchill, 2005, p. xxvi), those completed
indicate this collective diasporan Armenian identity is trapped as a victim of the genocide that
created it. It is impossible to give any sense of Armenianness without serious consideration of
the genocide; it is an inevitable part of modern Armenian identity (Theriault, 2003). This is
particularly evident for the diaspora, which originally formed as a result of the genocide
(Hovannisian, R., 2003).
Examining the major studies published in English allows insight into the lasting
impact of the genocide on diasporan communities. One American study describes the
genocide as the Armenian “overarching cultural narrative” and presents some of the
difficulties that arise from limited cultural knowledge of identity due to genocide
(Manoogian, Walker, & Richards, 2007). Ethnographic fieldwork conducted in an Armenian
community in Russia has also provided key insights into Armenian diasporan-consciousness.
There, Ulrike Ziemer found that the genocide remains a significant factor influencing
Armenian identity, both in the sense of the personal family narrative as well as the diasporan
“collective identity” (2010a, p. 295). In her study of tensions between descendants of
genocide victims and recent Armenian migrants to Greece, Susanne Schwalgin (2004)
emphasizes a contrast between an imagined “pure,” pre-genocide Armenia and the presentday, impoverished, post-Soviet Republic of Armenia. This contrast is an indication that in
Volume 21, Number 1

71

Peace and Conflict Studies
many ways, the Armenian homeland of the diaspora no longer exists. In that sense Armenian
diasporan longing for “homeland” may be, particularly for the older, original diasporan
communities formed immediately after the genocide, a longing for both a place and time
before genocide.
The genocide’s other significant and long-reaching consequence is the Turkish denial,
described as “the most consistent, strident, and elaborate state-organized attempt to conceal a
record of past atrocities” (Cohen, 2001 p. 134). During and after the genocide, the Young
Turk government, and each consecutive Turkish government, claimed to be innocent of any
wrongdoing. They institutionalised an official policy of denial that began in tandem with the
genocide and continues through today (Balakian, 2003, epilogue). In Turkey, article 301 of
the Turkish penal code makes it a federal crime to mention the unrecognized genocide
because it is an insult to “Turkishness” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 137). Although the word
“genocide” did not exist until World War II, witnesses and international media described the
state-planned massacres using the same terminology that would come to define the crime
(Balakian, 2003, p. xix). Despite this, Turkey maintains its denial, and “truths that were
certain at the time … were transformed into speculation, rumours, and uncertainties” (Cohen,
2001, p. 134). Denial is a typical criminal strategy to “promote forgetting” (Herman in
Balakian 2003, p. 373). Prior to the 1970s, the denial was passive (Balakian, 2003, p. 379;
Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 96, 114), but it has since become increasingly widespread,
systematic and well-funded (Theriault, 2001). The Turkish government fuels the denial
internationally by political manipulation and financial incentive. Through these means it has
even gained the support of some academics (Hovannisian, R., 1997).
Denial has been described as the final phase of genocide and the desecration of
historical memory (Hovannisian, R., 1999). Framed in this sense, the Armenian genocide has
not officially ended, but is still actively carried on by Turkish government officials a century
later. The individuals who died – often after suffering malicious violence including torture
and rape (Balakian, (2003[1918]) and (Sarafin 2000[1916]) document the extreme violence
employed, a typical aspect of genocide), and their centuries of cultural existence in the
Ottoman Empire, are still under attack. This continued denial prevents Armenians from
moving on in any way from the genocide. Diasporan Armenians advocate for recognition of
the genocide often more fervently than Armenian nationals, who have been forced to move
on in some ways due to their political realities (Hovannisian, G., 2010; Judah, 2012). For
example, when diasporan Raffi Hovannisian, an Armenian American, served as foreign
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minister in the first post-Soviet Armenian government, his hard stance demanding genocide
recognition was one of the reasons President Levon Ter-Petrosyan requested his resignation
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 171-178). Thomas de Waal (2010) notes, “In October 2009,
many diaspora Armenians, mostly descendants of Genocide survivors, found themselves in
the awkward position of denouncing the Yerevan government for moving to normalize
relations with Turkey” (p. 31). Examples like these illustrate how the continued denial has
managed to cause tensions even between Armenians.
Genocide and Denial: Setting Precedents
It was the destruction of the Armenians by the Ottoman state – viewed as an internal
affair of a sovereign entity by international laws of the time – that first inspired the Polishborn lawyer Raphael Lemkin to create a framework in international law for the concept of
genocide (Power, 2007, pp. 17-19). Indeed, he created the term genocide himself. Although
he began this effort in the 1930s, while warning people with a prophetic nature of the Nazi
regime’s intentions, he failed to convince either the community of international lawmakers or
even his own family that action needed to be taken. As a result, he lost 49 of his family
members, including his parents, in the Holocaust (p. 49). He dedicated his entire life to the
creation and ratification of the genocide convention, article 2 of which defines genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: killing members of the group;
causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within
the group; [and] forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (Power,
2007, p. 62)
Based on this definition, and perhaps on its adoption by the UN in 1948, while the Nazi
atrocities of WWII remained forefront in people’s minds, the Holocaust became the defining
example of what a genocide is (Akçam, 2012, p. xxix). Yet, Lemkin’s aim was to create an
international law expressly forbidding and making punishable what had happened to the
Armenians as well as the Jews.
Scholars agree that the Armenian genocide was a direct predecessor to the Holocaust, in
part because Germany, as the Ottoman ally and mentor, had German officers assisting in the
genocide (Balakian, 2003, p. 167; Coloroso, 2008; Lifton, 2003). One of the most ubiquitous
quotations now associated with the Armenian genocide is the rhetorical question Hitler posed
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prior to the Nazi invasion of Poland: “Who still talks nowadays of the extermination of the
Armenians?” (Balakian, 2003, pp. 164-165). One might imagine that this would have drawn
Armenian and Jewish survivors together in mutual support, recognition and solidarity, but this
has unfortunately not been the case. Writing in the 1970s, Armenian American Michael Arlen
witnessed both defensive Armenian and Jewish reactions to the mention of the “other”
genocide (Arlen, 1976), and in the course of my own research 35 years later, I have
encountered the same. In a detailed comparison of genocide denial strategies, eminent
Armenian historian Richard Hovannisian (1997) describes efforts to create animosity
between Armenians and Jews:
Deniers of the Armenian Genocide uphold the truth and criminality of the Holocaust
and make an appeal to keep it uncontaminated by confusing it in any way with the
hoax of a so-called Armenian genocide; deniers direct representations of their
version of the Armenian genocide to Jewish groups as well as the Israeli
government. (p. 43)
It is disappointing but not surprising that, in response, many Armenians feel historically
overshadowed by the widely recognized Holocaust despite the two events’ closely connected
narratives and their joint basis for the formation of Lemkin’s genocide convention.
The successful Turkish effort to frame the Armenian genocide as “illegitimate” to
Jewish groups is an example of Patricia Williams’ “representational force” (1998). This refers
to the ways groups are represented to each other (and the wider community) and consequently
by each other. This process results in the continual (re)creation and (re)enforcement of borders.
The Armenian genocide is represented as illegitimate, and this illegitimacy is represented as a
threat to the legitimacy of the Holocaust. As members of Jewish groups absorb this
representation, they draw distinctions between Jewish and Armenian histories, and
consequently, between people. These distinctions are recreated and passed on, strengthening
the borders. Armenian perceptions of Jewish attitudes (regardless of the reality of these
attitudes) result in mutual border building and further group differentiation. Instead of finding
common ground, differences are continually highlighted. Representational force is powerful,
dangerous and unfortunate – these negative experiences of border creation and enforcement
may discourage Armenian collaborative efforts with non-Armenian groups, even if doing so
may be the best way to achieve their goals, as I will return to later.
The Turkish government denial remains the one major distinction between the
Armenian genocide and the Holocaust (Hovannisian, 1997). The denial has become
Volume 21, Number 1

74

Peace and Conflict Studies
institutionalized (p. 44). The Turkish government’s official position is that Armenians were
safely deported to Syria and Lebanon; although “gangs” attacked some Armenians and some
local authorities acted “irresponsibly,” this “emigration” was successful (Süleyman, 2008, pp.
122-123). This type of reinterpretation of historical events is a common tactic used by
governments to “manage outrage” over actions such as genocide (Martin, 2009). The actions of
the Turkish government as recently as 1996 put their denial in sharper context. They repatriated
the remains of Ismail Enver from Tajikistan several decades after his assassination by an
Armenian. Enver was one of the three Young Turk leaders who planned and coordinated the
genocide. In Istanbul, the former Ottoman capital, he received a state burial, during which the
Turkish president described him as an important national hero and symbol (Gakavian, 1997).
This echoes the Turkish government’s state burial of Mehmed Talât on Istanbul’s Hill of
Liberty after Hitler returned his remains in 1942, 21 years after Talât’s assassination by an
Armenian genocide survivor in Berlin (Power, 2007, pp. 2, 23). In Turkey today, there remain
streets, public schools, communities, and mosques honoring Talât’s legacy (Bedrosyan, 2013).
The ultimate goal of denial is to prevent the genocide from becoming part of global
collective memory (Hovannisian, 2003, p. 2), which, as noted, is the final phase of genocide
(Lipstadt in Balakian, 2003, p. 383). Turkey has thus far achieved some success of this final
phase of genocide by using political and financial pressure to obfuscate historical fact and deter
other nations from officially recognizing the genocide. More and more nations and government
bodies have recognized the genocide, including the Council of Europe in 2001 (Armenian
Genocide Museum-Institute “International Organisations” n.d. This website contains a list of all
recognizing governments and organizations). However, Turkey pressures the United States in
particular to prevent official recognition. In 2005, an American congressional committee passed
two resolutions to officially recognise the Armenian genocide as historical fact, but the Bush
administration refused to pass the resolutions due to their military relationship with Turkey
(Coloroso, 2008, p. 189). While Barack Obama acknowledged the genocide during his
senatorial tenure, he has yet to do so as U.S. president because of America’s strategic
partnership with Turkey (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). This has a historic precedent
as well: when the United States entered World War I, it declared war against Germany but not
the Ottoman Empire, choosing to maintain relations with the Turkish government, which
ultimately weakened its position in relation to post-war justice for Armenia (Balakian, 2003,
ch. 23).
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Governments that do take action to historically preserve the genocide face Turkish
retaliation. This issue drew international media attention in 2011 when the government of
France debated a bill to criminalize denial of any officially recognized genocide – including, in
France, the Armenian genocide. In response to this, the Turkish government recalled its
ambassador and banned French military vehicles from Turkish docks and airspace while
threatening further retaliation (“Watch your words,” 2011). France had seen this before, in
2000, when they passed a bill officially recognizing the genocide; at that time, Turkey took six
months to resume diplomatic relations with France (Balakian, 2003, p. 390). Although the 2011
bill became law in France, France’s Constitutional Council later overturned it (“French court
overturns,” 2012).
Strategies of denial also manipulate academics. The Institute for Turkish Studies in the
United States – funded by the Turkish government – awards grants to academics and then
requests their involvement in political action preventing genocide recognition (Balakian, 2003,
pp. 381-385; Hovannisian, 1997, p. 42). The Turkish government also uses coercion to fuel the
denial. For example, the first major conference considering all genocides was planned in Tel
Aviv in 1982. Some speakers intended to make reference to the Armenian genocide. For that
reason, the Turkish government put so much pressure on the universities and institutes
involved, as well as the Israeli government, that it was felt that “Jewish lives … were at risk”
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 122; Hovannisian, R., 1997, p. 7). Holocaust survivor and Nobel
Laureate Elie Wiesel stepped out as keynote speaker, and the conference had to be relocated.
These are examples of what Richard Hovannisian (1997) calls “the strategies of denialists,
rationalisers, relativisers, and trivialisers” (p. 52). In his comparison of the denial of the
Armenian genocide and the Holocaust, he details the identical methods of each and the equal
danger they present to academic integrity as well as human rights. Denialists conceal certain
facts, and distort and exaggerate others to make their claims convincing. To deny any genocide
proven by historical fact is to allow for the denial of them all; this behaviour creates a precedent
for future genocide denialists to exploit. Hovannisian also argues that allowing anyone to deny
the Armenian genocide, or allowing it to be forgotten by history, is collusion in ongoing
Turkish crimes (1997).
These examples of Turkish government efforts to maintain and promote the denial
speak to a collaborative repression of historical truth. This represses not only the historical facts
of violence against the Armenians, but also individual stories of Turkish and Kurdish heroism,
of individuals and families who risked their lives to help Armenians survive and escape (for
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example, see Bedrosyan, 2013). The Turkish government cannot maintain its denial alone if
others do not agree to go along with this, particularly its own citizens. Yet others continue to go
along with it. The Australian federal government, for example, has not officially recognized the
Armenian genocide. Australian history writers pay little attention to their nation’s close
connection to the genocide despite some suggestions that the Allied invasion of Gallipoli by
British, Australian and New Zealand troops on April 25, 1915 precipitated the start of the
Armenian genocide (Manne, 2011). The Allied attack likely heightened the Turkish siegementality and fueled a mania for ridding the empire of Armenians, according to historian Jay
Winter (in Balakian, 2003, p. 178). Australia’s failure to link the two events in the national
consciousness or even actively address their connection has been described as a “cult of
forgetfulness on a national scale” (W.E.H. Stanner in Manne, 2011, p. 324). This suits the
Turkish government’s purposes and maintains the genocide’s goals.
The significance and impact of Turkish denial are complex. Beyond the points
illustrated above, Henry Theriault (2003) describes four ways the denial is not only collusion of
the crime against the Armenian people, but also an extension of it. Deniers are “accessories
after the fact” by assisting those responsible in evading guilt (p. 242). Denial is also a form of
grave desecration, in the sense that writing about the genocide serves to remember those whose
graves remain unknown or whose bodies were left unburied (p. 248). Armenian identity and
culture come under attack by deniers as well, because of the genocide’s essential role in
contemporary Armenian identity – to deny the genocide is to deny a significant part of the
Armenian historical experience (p. 247). Theriault’s analysis reflects on the denial from the
Armenian point of view, but the denial has had significant impact on Turkish citizens as well.
The Turkish government’s human rights abuses include incarceration and prosecution of
journalists, writers and activists and excessive force on the part of the police, who are immune
to accountability (Human Rights Watch, n.d.). The repression of journalists, writers and
activists is the attempt to repress witnesses, alternative voices, truth, and inevitably, memory.
The denial also causes psychological harm because it is a celebration of the violent
destruction of Armenians and a further rubbing of “salt in their already gaping wounds”
(Alayarian, 2008, p. 30). In Consequences of Denial, a psychological assessment of Armenian
post-genocide trauma, Aida Alayarian details the psychological effects of the Turkish denial on
Armenians. She argues that, psychologically, the Armenian history of trauma has gone largely
unacknowledged and undiagnosed. Alayarian describes silence as a further kind of trauma
causing acute mental distress: for decades the Armenian genocide existed largely in “a kind of
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conspiracy of silence” (p. 118) which made it that much harder for Armenians to risk
stigmatisation and humiliation by speaking about it; this only began to change in the 1990s (pp.
116-119). Armenian culture is too often solely associated with the violence of the genocide,
and as a result, “the way in which they relate to their cultural origins is often influenced by
feelings associated with loss, anger and rage at having lost their culture” (p. xxviii). This point
is particularly salient for diasporans, who may be disconnected from the Armenian language
and religion and thus have little other connection to or understanding of Armenianness.
When trauma is experienced on such a mass scale and left unaddressed, it is passed
from one generation to the next. Subsequent generations can experience similar psychological
effects without the capacity to express their origins (Alayarian, 2008, p. 46). The genocide, as a
key aspect of pan-Armenian consciousness, has entrapped Armenian identity: Armenians
cannot turn away from the genocide even momentarily, but must guard it against the continued
attacks of denial. Ironically, Turkish identity is similarly trapped by the need to perpetuate the
denial; the people of Turkey would benefit from mourning the events of the genocide, as a way
of moving beyond it (Göçek, 2003).
Collaborative Struggles for Turkish Acknowledgment
The genocide is an historical event of which many Turks remain largely ignorant, a
result of successful government efforts with this intention (Akçam in Balakian, 2003, p. 375).
As part of this effort, the history of Armenians as a once-significant community within the
borders of modern Turkey has been actively erased (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 225). However,
in recent years there have been indications that an increasing number of Turkish citizens are
becoming aware of this history (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009). A significant turning
point within Turkey was the murder of Turkish Armenian journalist and Editor, Hrant Dink,
who had written articles urging recognition of the Armenian genocide. Dink was shot outside
his Istanbul office on January 19, 2007. The killer, a seventeen-year-old “ultranationalist,”
claimed his motivation was Dink’s offense of Turkish honour (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler,
2009). As the documentary Aghet – a genocide (Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009) depicts,
Dink’s murder sparked a demonstration march of “hundreds of thousands” of Turks wanting to
honour his efforts. The marchers carried signs reading “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all
Armenians.” A former Turkish ambassador described the march as “very unusual,” and Dink’s
daughter, Delal, said of the march,
Nobody could imagine that in Turkey, that many people would go on the street and
say “We are all Hrant Dink. We are all Armenians.” There is this public who are
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really raising their voice and, well, the state has to hear it at some point and I think
they are hearing it. (In Trebitsch, Schültze, & Friedler, 2009)
The march has since become an annual event in Istanbul. In January 2012, it grew into a
protest involving “tens of thousands of Turks” who used the occasion to contest Turkey’s
lack of media freedom and corrupt justice system (Albayrak, 2012). The willingness of some
Turkish citizens to protest may stem from an empathetic stance for the repression of Turkey’s
fourteen million Kurdish citizens and their desire for an independent or autonomous Kurdish
state (“Turkey and its rebel Kurds,” 2010). This also dates back to the end of the Ottoman
Empire, when Kurds believed in a realistic opportunity for an independent nation based on
their close relationship with the Young Turk government – a relationship so close that many
Kurds had an active role in the Armenian genocide (Hovannisian, G., 2010, pp. 225-226). It
is an irony of history that after Kurds helped rid eastern Turkey of Armenians and other
Christians, they then became subjects of Turkish repression. Now, their struggles against
Turkey’s government are also drawing attention to the historic treatment of the Armenians
and the genocide denial. Kurdish leaders in Diyarbakir, Turkey have recently issued a
recognition and apology for the role Kurdish communities played in the Armenian and
Assyrian genocides, and called on Turkish authorities to recognize the genocide and take
steps towards atonement (Akkum, 2013).
Collaboration has been a factor in some recent efforts for Turkish recognition,
particularly at the academic level. In 2000, 126 international holocaust scholars signed an
affirmation of the Armenian genocide as historical fact and published it in The New York
Times (“Centre for Holocaust,” n.d.). The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute (n.d.)
(“Public Petitions”) also has a petition of 150 scholars and writers who condemn the denial and
urge governments and media to recognize and refer to the Armenian genocide as such. Under
the heading “Recognition,” the website for the 2009 genocide documentary Aghet – a genocide
(n.d.) lists 15 Turkish scholars who have recognized the Armenian genocide. One of these,
historian Taner Akçam, situates himself within this struggle in describing his writing as “a call
to the people of Turkey to consider the suffering inflicted in their name” (2006, p. 2). Akçam
used his access to Turkey’s state archive to publicize nationally “self-incriminating documents”
(Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216). In The Young Turks’ Crime Against Humanity, Akçam (2012)
uniquely draws together both Muslim Turkish historical perspectives and those of other ethnic
religious groups present during the era of the genocide, including the Ottoman Armenians (p.
xiii). Akçam and others emphasize the importance of acknowledgment of responsibility for
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mass acts of violence and hatred in order to prevent their future recurrence (Akçam, 2006, p. 2;
Coloroso, 2008).
Equally important to Akçam’s research is the fact that a Turkish historian had the desire
and courage to use official Turkish sources to further document and definitively prove the
genocide, although this has meant he is no longer able to live in Turkey (Akçam, 2006, n.p.)
and has been listed as a target for assassination by the same terrorist group that assassinated
Hrant Dink in Istanbul (Akçam, 2012, p. xii). When Akçam, together with sociologist Fatma
Müge Göçek and novelist Elif Şafak, spoke about the genocide at a University of California
conference in 2005, it was the first time Turkish professors acknowledged the genocide in an
international conference dedicated to Armenian history. Garin Hovannisian, an Armenian
American writer, described the conference as the beginning of a new movement: “Finally, an
alliance of Armenian and Turkish intellectuals was preparing to confront the original sin of
modern history” (Hovannisian, G., 2010, p. 216).
Other examples of collaborative efforts include the “Armenians, Forgive Us” campaign,
an online petition launched by 200 Turkish intellectuals, journalists, and public and cultural
figures (Abrahamyan, 2010). The petition offered acknowledgment of and apology for the
denial of what it referred to as the “Great Catastrophe.” Approximately 30,000 people signed
the petition in its first ten days online (Aghet n.d.). This seems to be an optimistic indication of
Turkish citizens’ growing awareness of their national history from perspectives beyond their
own government’s, and their willingness to acknowledge the past and push for a more honest
and reflective future.
Armenians and Turks also need to engage in dialogue, a healing strategy Alayarian
feels is essential to both groups’ ability to renounce culturally embedded hatred and “humanize
de-humanized actions” (Alayarian, 2008, p. 143). Dialogue between descendants of victims and
perpetrators is necessary to move past the trauma suffered by both (Schwab, 2004, pp. 177-95).
The Armenian diaspora can offer a “neutral” starting place for dialogue, particularly in
communities that are home to both Armenians and Turks. Susan Arpajian Jolley, a third
generation Armenian American teacher, provides an excellent example of this when she
describes the process of memoir writing she undertook with her high school class, which
included three recent Turkish immigrants (Jolley, 2004). Many organisations have also begun
creating opportunities for Turks and Armenians to meet and collaborate, such as the
international non-profit organisation Internews, which organised the creation of collaborative
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documentaries with filmmakers from both sides of the Turkish-Armenian border (“CrossBorder film,” 2012).
Theriault (2001) has warned, “Denial is becoming the inevitable future of genocide” (p.
241). The global recognition and remembrance of the Armenian genocide is an issue that has
personal significance for Armenians, but also political significance for the world community as
a human rights issue. In their identity negotiation, Armenians have to reconcile the violent
deaths of family members, neighbours and entire communities; the permanent removal of
Armenians from much of their traditional homelands; and the ongoing and virulent effort to
permanently erase those events from world history. In light of this, it seems imperative for
Armenians to continue to not only advocate for genocide recognition and Turkish admittance of
responsibility, but to consider the most effective ways of doing so, even if this may require
overcoming uncomfortable barriers such as those of representational force.
April 24, 2015 will mark the one-hundredth anniversary of the Armenian genocide. In
the lead up to this event and the commemorations themselves, Armenians and human rights
activists have the opportunity to draw increasing attention to the issue of Turkish denial. The
2013 Taksim Square protests in Istanbul were also helpful in drawing international attention to
the democratic failings of Turkey’s government and its repressive tactics against free speech.
Activists should use the opportunity to tie the protests, which began as a way to protect Gezi
Park from demolition, to the issue of Armenian repression in Turkey – Gezi Park was, for
several centuries, an Armenian cemetery, but it was destroyed in the period of Turkification
and Armenia erasure after World War I (Greenhouse, 2013). Just as during the Taksim Square
protests, Turkish activists can continue to draw attention to their government’s ongoing failures
of justice, and make genocide recognition part of this platform. Diasporans in the United States,
Europe, Australia and elsewhere would benefit by joining in solidarity with Turkish activists,
both in their home nations and in Turkey.
As Akçam and other Turkish scholars have demonstrated by working together with
Armenian scholars, a collaborative approach changes the debate from one of Turks versus
Armenians to one of repression versus human rights. Armenian diasporan communities have
many international community organizations, such as the Armenian General Benevolent Union
and the Armenian National Committee. These organizations serve their Armenian communities
and support recognition efforts, as success in recognizing countries and other state bodies, and
near success in the United States demonstrates. Turning some of these efforts specifically to
working with Turkish activists may strengthen the already growing awareness movement in
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Turkey, as demonstrated by the Armenians, Forgive Us campaign and the marches
commemorating Hrant Dink. It seems that for advocacy to finally succeed in shifting Turkish
public and government perception to bring recognition by Turkey, it needs to, at least in part,
come from within Turkey in a collaborative struggle of both victims’ and perpetrators’
descendants.
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Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace: A Test in the Developing World
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Abstract
This paper aims to test the capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the developing
world. Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two
different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the
proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into
account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their
hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study
aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the
developing world. It tests the capitalist and democratic peace arguments through statistical
analysis (logistic regression) of the militarized interstate disputes in the developing world
between 1951 and 2000. The results support the “capitalist peace” argument and suggest that,
within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas
democracy does not. The findings are robust to different measures of conflict, democracy and
economic development.

Introduction
“Democratic peace” has been one of the most extensively studied phenomena of
international relations in the last three decades. The proponents of the democratic peace
theory argued that democratic norms and institutions have rendered militarized conflicts
among democratic countries unprecedentedly rare, if not obsolete. Yet the theory has been
criticized on a variety of grounds as well. Two recent challenges to the democratic peace
theory are the “capitalist peace” and “non-universality” arguments. The former argues that it
is capitalism, rather than democracy, that accounts for the rarity of conflicts among
contemporary democracies, while the latter contends that democracy’s peaceful effects on
interstate relations are limited to Western Europe and North America.
This article aims to make a simultaneous test of these two challenges to the
democratic peace theory as well as the theory itself. It tests the capitalist and democratic
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peace arguments through statistical analysis of the militarized interstate disputes in the
developing world between 1951 and 2000. In the remainder of this paper, I first provide a
brief summary of the literature on democratic and capitalist peace. Then, I make a case for
the need for separate statistical analysis of interstate conflict in the developing world.
Subsequently, using logistic regression, I test democratic and capitalist arguments for peace
through analyzing the dyadic militarized interstate disputes of developing countries between
1951 and 2000. Finally, I conclude with a summary of my findings and highlight their
importance for future research.
Democratic vs. Capitalist Peace
Since Small and Singer (1976) reported that democracies have not fought each other
in the modern era, numerous empirical studies have been published in influential political
science journals to confirm this “democratic peace”. By mid 1990s, some proponents of the
democratic peace had already awarded the phenomenon a “law-like status” (Levy, 1994, p.
352). Even the critics of the democratic peace theory conceded that democratic peace has
been the “preeminent nontrivial fact of international relations” (Mousseau, 2002, p. 137) and
the democratic peace theory has been “probably the most powerful liberal contribution to the
debate on the causes of war and peace” (Rosato, 2003, p. 585).
The “Kantian liberals” have introduced two alternative explanations for the relative
peace among democracies: one institutional and the other normative. The institutional
account of the democratic peace argued that the institutional structure of democratic countries
restrains them from waging costly wars, in particular against other democracies, thereby
leading the decision-makers to settle their international disputes peacefully (Bueno de
Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Lake, 1992; Russett, 1993). As Maoz and
Russett explain it,
due to the complexity of the democratic process and the requirement of securing a
broad base of support for risky policies, democratic leaders are reluctant to wage
wars, except in cases wherein war seems a necessity or when the war aims are seen
as justifying the mobilization costs. (Maoz & Russett, 1993, p. 626)
The normative account, on the other hand, argued that democratic countries perceive each
other as friends sharing common values and norms, and this mutual perception results in the
peaceful resolution of conflicts (Maoz & Russett, 1992, 1993; Owen, 1994). In Owen’s
words, “once liberals accept a foreign state as a democracy, they adamantly oppose war
against that state” (Owen, 1994, p. 95).
Volume 21, Number 1

86

Peace and Conflict Studies
The democratic peace theory also had its dissidents since its inception and has been
widely criticized on both theoretical and empirical grounds. Realist, Marxist, and powertransitionist scholars of international relations argued from different perspectives that it was
convergence of interests and policy, rather than norms and institutions, which created a
relative peace among Western democracies in the post-WWII era (see e.g. Barkawi & Laffey,
1999; Farber & Gowa, 1995; Layne, 1994; Lemke & Reed, 1996; Oren, 1995; Rosato, 2003;
Spiro, 1994).
A recent challenge to the democratic peace theory is the argument that the correlation
between democracy and peace is spurious and it is capitalism, rather than democracy, which
has created a relative “zone of peace” among democratic countries (Gartzke & Hewitt, 2010;
Gartzke, 2007; McDonald, 2010; Mousseau, 2009). According to the proponents of the
capitalist peace theory, capitalism reduces the use of force in interstate relations by deemphasizing land and minerals (Gartzke, 2007), establishing contract-intensive economies
(Mousseau, 2009), and reducing the state’s role in the economy (McDonald, 2010), thereby
leading to “capitalist peace”.
The “capitalist peace” argument currently suffers a weakness that the democratic
peace argument suffered until recently, namely an unsubstantiated universality claim. Despite
the presence of considerable empirical evidence which indicates that democracy’s (and
several other variables’) effect on interstate conflict varies in developing and developed
worlds (Goldsmith, 2006; Henderson, 2003, 2009; Mousseau, 2002), the proponents of the
“capitalist peace” argument as well as the scholars who challenged them via statistical
refutations (Choi, 2011; Dafoe, 2011) have not taken into account the distinction between
developing and developed countries and tested their hypotheses within samples that included
“all dyads” in different time periods. This article aims to fill this gap by testing capitalist and
democratic peace arguments within the developing world.
Studying Interstate Conflict in the Developing World
The importance of context in international politics is well studied by scholars of
International Relations (IR) (Diehl & Goertz, 2001; Goertz, 1994; Kacowicz, 1998).
Contextual analysis of international relations refers to a study that takes into account the
categorical differences between two or more “groups of states” and can be based on
differences in region, history, regime-type, major-minor power status, economic
development, and many others. The differences between the developed and developing states
were one of the primary systematic differences that struck the critics of the mainstream IR
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theories. Some (Bilgin & Morton, 2002; Jackson, 1993) have questioned the relevance of the
very concept of “the state” to the developing world and argued that many third world states
lack central features of a standard Western state, such as sovereignty, legitimacy, and selfsustenance. Wallerstein (1974) contended that whereas the economic development of the
Western countries and the increasing wealth and power of the bourgeoisie were accompanied
by the construction of “strong” states, the dependent situation of the Third World countries
and their openness and vulnerability to the manipulations of the core countries resulted in the
creation of “weak” states. Somewhat as an elaboration on these arguments, some others
argued that the “insecurity dilemma”, which derives from the internal “weakness” of the
Third World countries, rather than the oft-argued security dilemma, shapes the security
strategies of the Third World countries (Ayoob, 1995; Glenn, 1997; Job, 1992). There were
also other scholars who problematized the “independence” of Third World states (Clapham,
1999; Escude, 1998; Hey, 1995) and maintained that the economic and political dependence
of the Third World countries to the developed world render the “hierarchical” nature of the
international system more relevant to the foreign policy behavior of developing states than its
“anarchical” structure. Neuman (1998) makes an interesting summary of these arguments:
For many LDCs [less developed countries], then, the realist focus on a sharp
boundary between domestic “order” and international “anarchy” may be
applicable, but in reverse. It is the hierarchical structure of the world that provides
them with an ordered reality, and a “condition of unsettled rules” that afflict them
at home. (p. 3)
In line with these theoretical concerns, some recent empirical research also suggested
a categorical difference between certain regions of the world. Henderson (2003) and
Goldsmith (2006) tested the regional contingency of the prominent democratic peace
argument and found that democracy loses its conflict-dampening effect outside the developed
West (Western Europe and North America). Similarly, other studies found democracy has no
or miniscule peaceful effect in poor countries (Mousseau, 2000, 2002; Mousseau, Hegre, &
Oneal, 2003). These empirical findings suggest that the purported categorical differences
between the developed world and the developing world are not mere constructs of the minds
of critical IR theorists. Thus, I believe that it is appropriate and necessary to make separate
tests for the developing world if we are to gauge the effects of capitalism and democracy on
international conflicts of developing countries.
Empirical Analyses: Militarized Interstate Disputes in the Developing World
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Methodology.
This research aims to test the democratic and capitalist explanations of peace within
the developing world by analyzing the dyadic conflict behavior of “developing states” only.
Consequently, dyads with two “developed” countries will be excluded from my analysis. I
analyze only dyads with two developing states and the ones that include a developing state
and a developed one.
Identifying “developed” countries entails some degree of arbitrariness, especially
when we study a long time period rather than a single point in time. Some of the 35 countries
that are currently identified a developed country by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
were not developed countries in large sections of this study’s time period and gained their
“developed country” status towards the end of this period. Thus, I do not consider all current
developed countries as a developed country in this study. Countries that have been identified
as “developed” in this study are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) countries during the period I analyze except Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, Poland, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and
Greece. I considered the latter countries “developing states” given their relatively lower
Gross Domestic Product GDP per capita and industrialization levels before the 1990s. As a
general rule, I considered a country a “developed country” if its GDP per capita was at least
50 percent of the U.S. GDP per capita in more than half of the years between 1951 and 2000.
Following the general practice, I did not consider oil-rich countries developed countries.
Thus, the following countries are considered developed countries in this study: the US,
Canada, Britain, Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France, Switzerland, (West) Germany,
Austria, Italy, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Iceland, Japan, Australia, New Zealand,
Andorra, Monaco, and Liechtenstein. Any dyad that includes two of these developed
countries was excluded from my analysis.
The temporal domain of this research is the period between 1951 and 2000. Rarity of
“independent” states before 1950 as well as lack of reliable economic data for pre-1950 years
resulted in the exclusion of earlier years from the sample. Also, because most developing
states lack the capability to reach non-neighboring states, I analyzed contiguous dyads only in
order to avoid possible estimation problems that might result from artificial inflation of the
sample size with the inclusion of “irrelevant” cases. Two states are considered contiguous if
they share a land border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water.
The Dependent Variable.
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The dependent variable of this study is the occurrence of a militarized interstate dispute
(MID) in a given dyad-year. Following Russett and Oneal (2001) and many others, onset and
continuation of MIDs are treated the same. A MID is defined as an event where the
government or citizens of at least one state threatened, displayed, or used forced against the
government or citizens of at least one other state worldwide (Jones, Bremer, & Singer, 1996).
The dependent variable equals 1 if in a given year a dyad involves a MID, 0 otherwise. I use
Zeev Maoz’s (2005) dyadic MID data, which is a refined version of the Correlates of War
(COW) data on MIDs (Ghosn, Palmer, & Bremer, 2004). Given the dichotomous nature of
the dependent variable, I use logistic regression (logit) in my estimations.
Explanatory Variables.
Economic Development: Economic development is the major component of the
“capitalist peace”. In measuring the economic development level of a country, I use its real
gross domestic product per capita (GDPpc) measured in purchasing power parities
(thousands) and constant (1996) dollars. Data availability becomes a serious problem in
analyzing the economies of developing countries, though. In the most frequently used
economic dataset Penn World Table (Version 6.1) (Heston, Summers, & Aten, 2002),
economic data are unavailable sporadically for many countries and there is no GDP data at all
for eleven countries until 1990s. Consequently, about 25% of observations in Penn World
Table’s GDPpc dataset are missing. However, Gleditsch (2002) introduces some measures to
reduce the number of missing observations in Penn World Table’s GDP as well as in
International Monetary Fund’s trade data and manages to have a complete dataset of GDP
and GDP per capita for years between 1945 and 2000. I follow Dixon’s (1993) “weak link”
principle, which assumes that the likelihood of conflict is primarily a function of the degree
of constraints experienced by the less constrained state in each dyad, and consider the level of
development of the less-developed state for each dyad-year, a variable I call development
low. To minimize the direction of causality problems, all data on economic development are
lagged one year.
Democracy: To determine national levels of democracy and autocracy, I use Polity IV
(Marshall & Jaggers, 2004) data, which has become the standard for measuring institutional
democracy, particularly in the study of international conflicts. The Polity IV dataset provides
an 11-point scale (0-10) of autocracy and an 11-point scale (0-10) of democracy. To
determine the “net” democracy score of a country, I subtract its autocracy score from its
democracy score, which yields a range of -10 to 10. I add 11 points to each score and
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construct a scale of 1-21. I adopt the “weak link” principle in determining the effects of
regime type on conflict as well and create a democracy low variable. As in the economic
development variable, all data are lagged by one year.
Control Variables.
Capability ratio: To determine the capabilities of each country, I use the Correlates of
War (COW) data (Singer & Small, 1995), which gauges the National Capabilities of states
from their population, industry, and military forces. Capability ratio is calculated by taking
the ratio of the stronger state’s military capability index to that of the weaker member in each
dyad. A higher score indicates higher power discrepancy, or less power parity, in a dyad. The
final variable Logcapratio, is the natural log of the capability ratio in a dyad.
Alliance: The variable alliance equals one if countries A and B are formally allied
through either a defense pact, entente, or non-aggression pact; it is zero otherwise. I use
COW’s data on alliances.
Major power: To control for the higher conflict-proneness of major powers, I use a
major power variable, which equals 1 if a dyad includes at least one major power and 0
otherwise. The US, the USSR, Britain, France, and China are considered as major powers for
the entire period I analyze; Germany and Japan are regarded as major powers after 1989.
State age (longevity): Several developing countries gained their independence during
the time period covered by this research. Younger states are expected to focus on state
building and internal problems and to avoid external conflicts. To control for lower conflict
propensity in early statehood, I create a state age variable, which equals the number of years
since independence for each state. As in other variables, I use the state age of the younger
state in each dyad. The COW’s “state system” data specifies the dates for each state’s entry
into the international system.
Developed state: Lastly, to control for the possible distinct relationship between alldeveloping-state dyads and the mixed (developing-developed) ones, I include a developed
state dummy, which equals 1 if a dyad includes a developed state and 0 otherwise.
--Because my data have a cross-sectional time-series nature, I introduce measures to
correct or relieve temporal autocorrelation and cross-sectional heterogeneity. Following
Beck, Katz, and Tucker’s (1998) suggestion to correct temporal dependence and using
Tucker’s (1999) btscs program, I created a peaceyears variable, which counts the years since
the last MID, and three cubic splines. Finally, I report robust standard errors clustered on
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dyad.
Thus, my final equation on militarized interstate disputes of developing countries is as
follows:
MIDij t = a + b1 DEVlowt-1 + b2 DEMlowt-1 + b3 LogCAPRATIOij t + b4 ALLIANCEij t
+ b5 DEVELOPEDt + b6 MAJORt + b7 STATE-AGEt + b8 Peaceyearst + b9 Splines +
e.

Results.
Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression analysis of the probability of a
militarized interstate dispute in a developing-state dyad. To start with the control variables,
all but the developed-state variable have statistically significant effects on the relations within
a developing-state dyad. Whereas formal dyadic alliances of developing states and increasing
power discrepancy in a developing-state dyad were found to decrease the likelihood of a
MID, inclusion of a major power or an older state in a developing-state dyad was found to
increase the likelihood of a dyadic MID.
Table I: Logit Estimates of the Probability of a Militarized Interstate Dispute in a Developingstate Dyad, 1951-2000
Variables

Coefficient

Robust SE

-0.0096

0.0113

Developmentlow

-0.0743***

0.0238

Capability ratio
(log)

-0.1597***

0.0451

Alliance

-0.5023***

0.1311

Major Power

0.2940*

0.1677

Developed

0.0063

0.2019

State agelow

0.0070***

0.0015

Peaceyears

-0.1089***

0.0272

Democracylow

N
Log likelihood
2

12175
-3108.8653

Wald chi (11)

552.26

2

0.0000

Prob>chi

2

Pseudo R
0.2365
P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.

As for the theoretical variables in Table I, development low’s coefficient had a
negative sign and is significant at 99% significance level (p<.002). However, the effect of
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democracy low was statistically insignificant even at 90% level. Thus, higher economic
development is found to decrease the likelihood of a dyadic MID in the developing world,
whereas democracy’s effect on the same likelihood was insignificant. These findings counter
the democratic peace argument and support the central argument of the more recent
“capitalist peace” literature, which contends that it is capitalism, rather than democracy, that
leads to peace among states.
Table II displays the substantive effects of development (low), capability ratio,
alliance, major power, and state age (low) variables on the probability of a dyadic MID in a
developing-state dyad. An increase from 3,000 dollars (mean value) by a standard deviation
of 3,150 dollars in the GDPpc of the poorer country in a developing-state dyad decreases the
likelihood of a MID in that dyad by almost 20%. Graph I below displays the marginal effect
of economic development (low) in the probability of a MID in a developing-state dyad. The
likelihood of a militarized interstate dispute, which is almost 7% when the GDPpc of the
poorer state in the dyad is 1,000 US dollars, declines to below 2% when the GDPpc of the
poorer state in that dyad reaches to 20,000 US dollars.
Table II: Changes in the Predicted Probability of a MID in a Developing-state Dyad.
Variable
economic development

Change in p(MID)
- 19.8 %

capability ratio

- 25 %

alliance

- 38 %

major power
state age

+ 31.5 %
+ 30 %

* Changes in predicted probabilities are changes from the base predicted probability of a dyadic militarized
interstate dispute in Table I (which was 0.06). In this and all other calculations of predicted probabilities, the
dyad is assumed to be non-allied and include no developed country or major power; all other variables are set at
their mean values.

As for the control variables, a dyadic alliance reduces the probability of a dyadic MID
by 38%, whereas major power inclusion increases the same probability by 31.5%. When
power disparity in a dyad is doubled from its mean value, the probability of a MID in that
dyad decreases by 25%. Lastly, doubling of the age of the younger state in a dyad from 40
(mean value) to 80 increases the probability of a dyadic MID by 30%.
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Graph I: Marginal effect of economic development in the probability of a MID in a developingstate dyad.
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Robustness Tests.
The results of statistical analyses are sensitive to choices regarding variables, sample, and
measurement. To test the robustness of my findings above, I reran my original model with

different dependent variables, different measurements of the explanatory variables, and
within different sub-samples. Table III displays these six replication models. Model 1 in
Table III is a replication of the original model, which treated the onset and continuation of
MIDs as the same, with onset MIDs only. Model 2 is a replication with a severer and more
specific dependent variable: MIDs in which use of force materialized. Not all MIDs have
equal seriousness and violence. Some remain as mere threats, some include actual use of
force, and some escalate to full-scale wars. The dependent variable -useforce- equaled 1 if a
dyad in a given year had a MID in which military force was actually used, and 0 otherwise.
Model 3 replicates the original model within a sample that includes developing countries
only. Dyads with a developed country are excluded. Model 4 is a replication of the original
model within a smaller sample, which excludes dyads that include two of the six Middle
Eastern oil-rich states, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Arab Emirates. Oil-rich countries are rich but mostly not industrialized and therefore might
deserve special attention when testing “capitalist peace” arguments. Model 5 is a replication
with a dichotomous measure of democracy. A group of scholars argue that democracy should
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be measured dichotomously, rather than continuously (see Elkins (2000) for a discussion of
continuous vs. dichotomous measures of democracy). In Model 5, a state is considered a
democracy if it had a “democracy – autocracy” score of 6 or higher in the original scale (or
17 or higher in my converted scale). Finally, Model 6 replicates the original model with a
relative, rather than absolute measure of development. Nominal values of indicators such as
gross domestic product per capita in time-series settings might be problematic because even
when using constant dollars we cannot avoid the problem of “rising average”. In measuring
relative economic development, I accepted the US GDP per capita as baseline (100) and
compared other states’ development levels with that of the US, i.e. Relative Developmenta =
(GDPpca/ GDPpcus)*100.
Table III: Replications of the original model.
CONFLICT TYPE & SEVERITY
(1)
(2)

SAMPLE
(3)

(4)

MEASUREMENT
(5)
(6)

D.V.:
Onset only

D.V.:
Use of force

NO
Developed

NO
Oil-rich Dyad

Dichotomous
Democracy

Relative
Development

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

Coefficient

-0.0041

-0.0133

-0.0070

-0.0111

-0.1594

-0.0146

Developmentlow

-0.0517***

-0.1052***

-0.0669***

-0.0656**

-0.0745***

-0.0163***

Capability Ratio
(log)

-0.1124***

-0.1474***

-0.1514***

-0.1600***

-0.1619***

-0.1595***

Alliance

-0.3092***

-0.5841***

-0.4989***

-0.4887***

-0.4979***

-0.4876***

0.3559**

0.0611

0.2007

0.2948*

0.2992*

0.2760*

0.1670

0.1430

-0.0164

0.0066

0.0388

State Agelow

0.0063***

0.0067***

0.0069***

0.0068***

0.0069***

0.0070***

Peaceyears

-0.0484***

-0.1122***

-0.1077***

-0.1084***

-0.1091***

-0.1081***

12175

12175

10991

11933

12175

12175

-2698.4385

-2651.4177

-2806.9213

-3091.1491

-3109.0604

-3108.604

Wald chi (11)

476.72

508.40

462.39

554.40

561.21

552.46

Prob>chi

2

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Pseudo R

2

0.1289

0.2331

0.2312

0.2346

0.2365

0.2366

Variables
Democracylow

Major Power
Developed

N
Log likelihood
2

P-values are based on two-tailed significance test. ***p<0.01; **p<0.05; *p<0.10.
Robust standard errors are clustered on each dyad. Three splines are not reported to save space.
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The results did not show any substantial change in any replication model so far as the
two explanatory variables are concerned. The signs and the statistical significance (or lack
thereof) of the development (low) and democracy (low) variables remained the same in all six
models in Table III. Development (low)’s effect on the likelihood of conflict was always
negative and statistically significant in all models; whereas that of democracy (low) never
achieved statistical significance even at 90% level. Thus, the earlier findings in Table I are
found to be robust. Within the developing world, economic development leads to interstate
peace, democracy does not.
Concluding Remarks
Notwithstanding the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence which indicate two
different dynamics of interstate conflict in the developing and the developed worlds, the
proponents of both “democratic peace” and “capitalist peace” arguments did not take into
account the distinction between developing and developed countries and tested their
hypotheses within samples that included “all dyads” in different time periods. This study
aimed to fill this gap by testing capitalist and democratic peace arguments within the
developing world.
My empirical results provided support to the “capitalist peace” argument and
countered the “democratic peace” argument. Economic development was found have a
negative, substantial, and statistically significant effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID in
the developing world. By contrast, democracy’s effect on the likelihood of dyadic MID never
achieved statistical significance even at 90% significance level. These findings were robust to
different measures of conflict, democracy and economic development. Thus, within the
developing world, it seems economic development leads to interstate peace, whereas
democracy does not. This result suggests that, in the developing world, economic
development is not just an issue of economic or humanitarian concern, but also a fundamental
security issue. To achieve sustainable global peace, policies that would foster economic
development in the developing world ought to be encouraged and supported.
This finding counters the “law-like status” argument for democratic peace (Levy,
1994) and supports the earlier research which suggested that the peaceful effect of democracy
is limited to Western Europe and North America (Goldstein, 2006; Henderson, 2003). As
such, what has so far been theorized as “democratic peace” might actually be “developed
democratic peace.” Thus, current overly-confident expectations about the peaceful
consequences of democratization in the developing world should be re-evaluated.
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Democratization in the developing world does not seem to bring international peace unless it
is coupled with economic development.
A major implication of this study for future research is that there seems to be some
qualitative differences between developing countries and the developed ones and it seems
these differences matter so far as involvement in militarized interstate disputes are concerned.
There is no reason to not expect that the qualitative differences between the developing and
the developed world would be relevant to other research programs in the field of international
conflicts, such as the purported peaceful effects of international trade or international
organizations. Scholars of international conflict are advised to be more cautious in pooling all
dyads and making universal claims.
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